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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1734 
J. GORDON BENNETT, ADl\iiNISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF W. R. B.ENNETT, DECEASED, 
versus 
ELIZABETI-I SPENCER AND THO~IAS M. SPENCER. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND SUPERSE-
DEAS. 
To .-:(he Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your Petitioner, J. Gordon Bennett, Administrator of the 
Estate of William R. Bennett, deceased, Plaintiff in an action 
for damages by way of Notice of Motion for judgment in 
the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Virginia, respectfully 
represents that he is aggrieved by a final judgment of the 
Circuit Court of said County entered on the lOth day of Sep-
tember, 1935. By said judgment a verdict for $5,000.00 in 
favor of the Plaintiff wa~ set aside and final judgment ren-
dered in favor of the DefendB:nt. A transcript of the record in 
said action is herewith presented as a part of this Petition. 
THE STATEl\fENT OF THE CASE. 
Petitioner was the Plaintiff in the Trial Court· and for con-
venience the parties herein will be. referred to as Plaintiff a.nd 
Defendants, according to the positions they occupied in the 
Trial Court. 
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W. R. Bennett, Chief of Police of the Town of South Bos-
ton, at about 7:30 o'clock P. l\L on the 23rd day of January, 
1935, was struck and killed by an automobile owned by th(~ 
. Defendant, Thomas M. Spencer, and driven by his daughter, 
the Defendant, Elizabeth Spencer. Thereupon, this action 
was brought by the Plaintiff, Administrator of said \V. R. 
Bennett, to recover damages from said Thomas l\L Spencer 
and Elizabeth Spencer for the alleged 'vrongful death of said 
Bennett. The action was tried in the Circuit Court of Ifali-
fax County on the 6th and 7th of September, 1935, before 
the Judge and a Jury. The Jury rendered a verdict in favor 
of the Plaintiff for $5,000.00, but this verdict the Court set 
aside by an Order entered on September 10, 1935, and by the 
same Order rendered final judgment for the D·efendants. To 
this action of the Court, Plaintiff excepted. · 
There was little conflict behveen the evidence offered on 
behalf of the Plaintiff and the Defendants, but such as existed 
was finally determ,ined by the verdict of the Jury in favor of 
Plaintiff. (Keeler v. Bawmgari/;n,er, 161 Va. 507.) 
The material facts of the case, stated in the light of the 
verdict of the Jury in favor of the Plaintiff, are as follows : 
The deceased, W. R. Bennett, was at the time of the acci-
dent in question, and had been for some years prior there-
to, Chief of Police of the Town of South B.oston. In addition 
to discharging the duties usually incident to the office of Chief 
of Police, he also acted as day patrohnan. There "'"ere n~> 
special traffic officers in South Boston, the regular force ahm 
acting as traffic officers. D·eceased 's tour aB a. patrolman 
began in the morning and ended at 7 P. ~I., and it 'vas his 
habit when he went off duty as a patrolman each night to meet 
the officers of the force who acted as night patrolmen and 
while 'valking to,vard his home discuss with them the hap .. 
penings of the day and give them their instructions. On the 
day that deceased met his death, that is January 23, 1935, he 
followed this usual routine. He acted. as patrolman during 
the day and then about 7:15 o'clock P. M. he met the two 
officers who were to patrol the streets during the night, Nolen 
and Fourqueran, and, as was his habit, walked down J\Iain 
Street with these officers towards his home, discussing 'vith 
them their duties. This particular evening the principal sub. 
ject of conversation was the traffic conditions on the streets 
of South Boston, particularly Main Street, do,vn the west 
sidewalk of which deceased and the two officers were walk-
ing. · 
On the night in question, deceased met up with Officer Nolen 
in front of or near the Municipal Building, which is located 
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on the corner of Main and Ferry Streets in South Boston. 
Officer Fourqueran joined them in front of the Liberty Cafe, 
which is on the same street, but a few doors south of the 
~Iunicipal Building. 1\fain Street of South Boston in this part 
of the town runs north and south, and deceased and these two 
officers 'valked south along the sidewalk on the west side of 
Main Street, discussing as already stated, matters relating to 
the duties of their respective positions, especially traffic con-
ditions on 1\'Iain Street and the measures that should be taken 
to improve these conditions. The three· officers proceeded 
in this way down l\lfain Street about. two blocks and when they 
had reached a point about 50 feet north of the intersection 
of l\~Iain and Bank Streets (Bank Street runs east and west), 
the police telephone, that was on the opposite side of Main 
Street, rang. Nolen 'vent across the street in a diagon~ 
direction to ans,ver the telephone and Bennett and Four-
queran followed him, crossing the street about 50 feet north 
of the intersection, diagonally, in a southeasterly direction. 
vVhen Bennett reached the middle of 1\'Iain Street he stopped 
and faced south, discussing with Officer Fourqueran, who was 
standing near him, the question of having a traffic light at 
tl1e intersection of ~fain and Bank Streets, just south of them. 
While the officers 'vere in this position no cars passed them 
going south, and there were no cars parked on the west side 
of 1\fain Street, 'vhich was 44 feet wide. One car passed 
them going north and parked in front of or near the store 
of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. Fourqueran pro-
ceeded across the street, but Bennett remained in the middle 
of the street, facing south, 'vith his· hands and arm.s raised 
and pointing upward and forward to the intersection that they 
·were discussing, still talking 'vth Fourqueran. While Ben-
nett was in this position, that is, in the middle of the street, 
facing south and with his hands and arms raised and point-
ing up and forward, the car driven by the Defendant, Eliza-
beth Spencer, but o'vned by her father, Thomas 1\L Spencer, 
approached from the north, traveling south, and ran into 
said Bennett from behind, inflicting on him selious injuries, 
from 'vhich he died witl1in a few days. Just as this car struck 
deceased, Fourqueran, who had crossed the street, called to 
him, but as he looked up in response· to this call the car 
struck him. He 'vas struck in the back by the right-hand 
light and right front fender of the car~ 
The point at which the accident happened was in the busi-
ness district of the Town of South Boston, where, under the 
laws of this State, a rate of speed in excess of fifteen miles 
per hour was prima facie negligent. 
It was proved that the car was going from thirty to thirty ... 
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five miles an hour; that it did not sound its horn before , 
striking the deceased; and the driver of the car admitted that 
she did not see the deceased until she was about eight feet 
from him, at which time she turned her car to the left, striking 
the deceased with the front right-hand side of the car. The 
. accident happened about 7:30 P. ~I. when it was dark, but the 
street was well lighted by the usual street lamps and the 
lights on the car were burning. Although it was raining 
slightly, it was proved that the visibility 'vas good and that 
the driver of the car could have seen the deceased several 
hundred feet before reach.ing him. 
Plaintiff claimed in the Trial Court that the driver of the 
car in question was negligent n the followng particulars: 
1. That she drove her car at an excessive rate of speed, and 
2. Failed to keep it under proper control, and 
3. Failed to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians and also 
failed to give proper warning of the approach of her car, 
and 
4. Failed to drive her automobile on her right-hand side 
(west side) of the street, there being nothing to prevent her 
doing so. 
The evidence amply supported these charges of negligence , 
and the Jury, by their verdict, determined that the driver 
of the car was guilty of these acts of negligence. In this re-
spect the verdict of the Jury was approved by the Court, 
which, in its final Order, said: "The Court • • • is of the 
opinion tha.t the Plaintiff's intestate has shown, as decided 
by the verdict of the ·Jury; that the Defendants were guilty 
of primary negligence.'' 
The defense, of course, claimed that the driver of the car 
was not negligent and also relied on the alleged contributory 
negligence of the deceased, claiming that deceased was neg-
ligent in that he 'vas crossing the street diagonally and at a 
point bet"reen intersections and at the time of the accident . 
was standing with his face turned away from the car 'vhich 
struck him and not keeping a proper lookout. Plaintiff con-
tended that the deceased was not guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, but also contended that even if he 'vere, the Defend-
ants were liable on the ground that the driver of the car had 
the last clear chance ·to avoid the accident in that had· she 
kept a proper lookout she would have discovered the peril of 
the deceased in time for the exercise of reasonable care to 
avoid the accident. The Court submitted to the Jury these 
questions of the primary negligence of the defendants and 
the contributory negligence of ·the deceased and also at the 
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request of Plaintiff instructed the Jury on the principle of 
last clear chance, giving Instruction P -5 (M. R., page 99) 
offered by the Plaintiff, and also modifying Instructions B 
(M. R., page 102), C (M. R., page 104) and E (M. R., page 
106), offered by the defense, so as to make them harmonize 
with this theory. The Jury returned a verdict for $5,000.00 
in favor of Plaintiff, but the Trial Court set aside this ver-
dict on the ground, as will app-ear from the Order, "That this 
is (was) not a proper cas-e for submission to the Jury on 
the doctrine of last clear chance''. Final judgment was en-
tered up for the defendants on the ground that the Court 
was of the opinon that deceased was- guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. 
We contend: 
1. That this was a proper case for the application of the 
doctrine of last clear chance, and · 
2. That even though the Court should not have instructed 
the Jury on this doctrine, still the question of contributory 
negligence on the part of the deceased was a question for 
the determination of the Jury, and that under no circum-
stances should the Court have depri~ed Plaintiff of his right 
to have .this question passed on by the .Jury, as it, in fact, 
did by entering final judgment for the Defendants. 
These are the two questions that will be mainly discussed 
in this Petition. The second will be the first one discussed. 
ARGUMENT. 
It is our eontenton that the question as to whether de-
ceased 'vas guilty of contributory negligence was for the Jury 
-not for the Court. This question 'vas first submitted to the 
Jury, but later taken from :the Jury and passed on by the 
Court. · 
The respective functions of the Court and Jury in such a 
case as this are well settled in Virginia. In the recent ·case 
of Rayless Stores v. DeJarnette, 163 Va. 938, 944, this Court 
quoted with approval from Virginia, etc., Coke Co. v. 
Perkey's .A.d·mr., 143 Va. 168, as follo,vs: 
''The question of negligence or due care are peculiarly 
within the province of the Jury and cannot be established as 
a matter of law by a state of facts about which reasonably 
fair-minded men may differ.'' 
The other phase of the question is aptly stated by Judge 
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Browning in City of Roanoke v. ·Sou.therland, 159 Va. 749, in 
this language : 
''Or, as the question has been otherwise expressed, though 
the facts are not disputed, negligence is still a question for 
the Jury, if different conclusions might be drawn by the 
minds of reasonable men from the facts as established.'' 
The foregoing principles were announced by the Court in 
dealing with the question of primary neglig·ence on the part 
of the defendant. The same principles, however, apply on 
the question of contributory negligence. 
In Morris and Co. v. Alvis, 130 Va. 434, 446, the Court said: 
''The Plaintiff's contributory negligence is not carried by 
the evidence beyond the realm 'vithin which reasonable men 
might fairly differ, and this question, was one for the Jury 
to settle. '' 
Again in Sou. Rwy. Co. v. Jones, 118 Va. 685, it was said: 
''The inferences to be drawn from the evidence .must be 
certain and incontrovertible, or they cannot be made by the 
Court. If it is a question about which reasonably fair minded 
.men may differ, it must be decided by the Jury; and if the 
Jury might have found for the Plaintiff on the Defendant's 
de;murrer to the evidence the Court must so find.'' 
The facts bearing on this question have so recently been 
stated in this Petition that ·we feel that it is unnecessary to 
again state them here. It will be recalled that the deceased 
just before the accident started across Main Street a short 
distance north of its intersection with Bank Street, and that 
when he reached the center of Main Street he stopped and 
:faced south, and 'vas there discussing with his subordinate 
the traffic conditions and the desirability of having a traffic 
light at the intersection just south of him. While deceased 
was in this position and engag:ed in this discussion the de-
fendant's car ran into him from behind. It is settled la:w 
-in Virginia that the same degree of care is not required of a 
pedestrian crossng a street as is required of one about to 
cross a railroad track. In the latter case the pedestrian must 
be continually on the lookout for approaching trains, while in 
the former he is only required to exercise reasonable or ordi-
nary care. 
J. G. Bennett, Admr., etc., v. Eliz. Spencer, et al. 7 
Core v. Wilhehn, 124 Va. 150. 
Green v. Ruff·in, 141 Va.. 628. 
In the forn1er case Judge Burks said: 
''The measure of duty enforced upon a pedestrian about 
to cross a city street where motor vehicles of all kinds are 
frequently passing is that he shall use such care as a person 
of ordinary prudence would use under like circumstances, 
and whether or not he did use snch care is ordinarily a ques-
tion for the Jury." 
In Green v. Ruffin, 'vhich 'vas a case where a pedestrian 
was crossing a city street diagonally and at a point between 
intersections, the Court said : 
''The plaintiff having the right to cross the street to her 
l1ome 'vhere she did, the next subject of inquiry is as to her 
duty as to the care she should exercise. That is to say, has 
she used the care 'vhich an ordinarily prudent person would 
use in the same place and und€r the· same circumstances? 
This is a question for the Jury. Core v. Wilhelrn, supra; Vir-
ginia Ry. and Power Co. v. Wellons, supra; Virginia Ry. 
and Powet· Co. v. Olive·r1 133 Va. 342, 112 S. E. 841." 
To the same effect are 
Ebel v. Traylor, 158 Va. 557. 
Bassett v. W ootl, 146 V a. 654. 
In Bassett ·v. fVood, page 668, the Court said: 
"The defendants' instruction No. 7 told the Jury that the 
ordinance of the city of Norfolk that provided that 'be-
tween street crossings all vehicles shall have the right of way 
over pedestrians', and that if Mrs. Wood undertook to cross 
Granby Street between College Place and Freemason Street 
she 'vas guilty of contributory negligence, is erroneous and 
should not have been given as amended or otherwise." 
In the case last referred to the Court expressly held that 
the Plaintiff was not guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law; that this was a question to be submitted to the Jury 
under proper instructions. We think that the instant case is 
a stronger one from the Plaintiff's standpoint than Green v. 
Ruffin. In Green v. Rttff·in the Plaintiff was struck and in-
jured by an automobile approaching her from behind while 
she was in the line of traffic of the automobile that struck 
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her; whereas, in the instant case the deceased· was in the cen-
ter of the street and not in the line of traffic of vehicles ap-
proaching from either direction, there being ample room on 
both sides of him for vehicles to pass in safety. In both 
Green v. Ruffin and Moore v. Scott, 160 Va. 610, the Court 
spoke of this position in the center of the street as one of 
"·Comparative safety". It was while deceased was in this 
position of comparative safety that he 'vas struck down from 
behind and killed. 
Another principle bearing on this question is the well es-
tablished one that a person has a right to assume that an-
other will not negligently injure him. Deceased had the right 
to assume that persons driving cars on the street at that time 
would discharge the duties in1posed on them by law, and to 
act on this assumption until the contrary appeared. 
Core v. Wilhel-m, 124 Va. 150, 154. 
Whi1J1Jle v. Booth, 155 Va. 413, 416. 
Moore v. Scott, 160 Va. 610, 619. 
Bennett was Chief of Police of South Boston, and no one 
knew better than he that it was the duty of the driver of 
a car to keep that car on his right-hand side of the street. He 
had the right to assume that the driver would comply with 
this requirement of the law. The driver of the car that struck 
him did not comply with this requiretnent, and gave the de-
ceased no warning of her failure to do so. 
There is still another fact bearing on this phase of the case 
that we consider most pertinent. Bennett was Chief of 
Police of the Town of South Boston. The control of traffic 
and the precautions that should be taken with reference to 
traffic on the streets of South Boston were within his juris-
diction. When he 'vas struck and killed he 'vas discharging 
these duties. These facts did not relieve Bennett of the 
obligation to exercise ordinary· care for his own safety, but 
they are material facts to be considered in determining 
whether he did in fact exercise such care. · 
In; Berry on Automobiles (6th Ed.), page 485, it is said: 
''The rights of a laborer whose duties require him to be 
in that part of the streets used by vehicles, with respect to 
such vehicles cannot be determined by the same rules appli-
cable to pedestrians with no occupation requiting their. pres-
-~nce in that part of the street. Not that he is bound to exer-
cise any less care, but because the care to be exercised must 
be determined from a different standpoint. His care or want 
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of care is a fact to be determined from all the circumstances 
surrounding him at the time.'' 
Again on page 491 the same authority says: 
''A traffic officer is not required to exercise the same de-
gree of care in looking for approaching vehicles as an ordi-
nary pedestrian. Where a traffic officer was struck from be-
hind by a vehicle driven on the wrong side of the street, while 
he was walking a few feet to the left of the center of the 
street, he ·was not guilty of contributory negligence in failing 
to look, as he had a right to assume that owing to his presence 
vehicles would keep to the right." 
The foregoing statement of the law is amply supported 
by the following authorities : .. 
Boyle v. Buntin Hrlw. Co. (Mo.), 238 S. W. 155. 
Fitzsi1nmons v. ls1nan, 151 N. Y. Supp. 552. 
Xennodopius v. Fifth Ave. Coach Co., 113 N.Y. Supp. 135. 
In volume 2 of Blashfield Enc. of Automobile Law, Sec. 
1577, the principle is stated in this language: 
"It is particularly true that a police or traffic officer on 
duty is not required to use the same degree of care in looking 
out for approaching vehicles as an ordinary person. A police-
man is not required to anticipate- that a motorist will violate 
traffic regulations thereby resulting in injury to him. How-
ever, a policeman must use reasonable c.are for his own 
safety.'' 
We presented to the Court three instructions mnbodying 
the principles just announced, hq.t the Court refused to give 
these. Howe.ver, it seems to us that this principle must neces-
sarily be considered in passing on this phase of the case. 
Of course, it is impossible for anyone to say what pl\ecau-
tions Bennett took before undertaking to cross the street. We 
]{now, however, that he did cross safely that part of the 
street that defendant's automobile should have occupied and 
that he did in safety reach tl~e center of the street, a posi-
tion of comparative safety. The law, however, does not im-
pose upon us the burden of proving that Bennett 'vas free 
of negligence. We did have the burden of proving that the 
defendant was guilty of primary neg·ligence, but the defense 
has the burden of proving that the deceased was guilty of 
contribut.ory negligence, if this defense is relied on. 
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Waynick v. lV alromb, 155 Va. 400. 
Core v. Wilhelm, 124 Va. 150. 
As we understand the evidence, there was no proof of the 
deceased's contributory. neglig~nce other than the admitted 
facts that the deceased just before the accident was crossing 
the street diagonally at a point between intersections, and 
that at the time of the accident he had his back to the car 
that struck him. Under the authorities cited we submit that 
these facts do not establish contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law; that this was a question for the Jury. 
If we look upon the deceased as an ordinary pedestrian, 
it is true, of course, that at the time he met his death he was 
violating a traffic statute of the State, in that just before 
the accident he 'vas Cl'ossing the street diagonally and be-
tween intersections. However, not every violation of a 
statute is contributory n~gligence. In order for the viola-
tion of a statute to bar recovery it must be a cause of the 
accident. 
In the recent case o~ Brcl,y v. Boston, etc., Corp., 161 Va., 
page 686, this principle was stated in the following language: 
''It is not necessary to the decision of this case to deter-
mine the status of the plaintiff, that is, whether or not he 
·was a pedestrian at the time the injury 'vas inflicted, 
because if we assume that he 'vas a pedestrian and at the 
time violating the statute, that does not affect the ultimate 
conc~usion to be reached, because his violation of the statute, 
if a pedestrian, was not the cause of the injury. This is but 
another "ray of saying that there must be causal connection 
between the violation of the statute and the injury, other-
wise the violation becomes immaterial. It is the 'veil-settled 
law of this State that unless it is shown that his violation 
of a statute was the proximate or contributing cause of the 
injury the plaintiff is not barred from a. right to recover. 
Kinsey v. Brugh, 157 Va. 407, 161.S. E. 41; C. and 0. Ry. Co. 
v. Barlow, 155 Va. 863, 156 S. E. 397. 
"In the case of Kinsey v. Brugh, supra, where the plaintiff, 
in violation of the statute, was driving a buggy on the high-
way after dark without displaying a light, and the defendant, 
driving his car, ran into the rear pf the buggy, this court 
upheld the judgment of the lower court, based on the verdict 
of the jury, on the ground that the negligence of the de-
fendant was the proximate cause of the injury, although the 
failure of the plaintiff to have a light on his buggy 'vas 
the renrrote rause. · 
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''It is said in Lavenstei1~ v. IJ!laile, 146 Va. 789, 132 S. E. 
844, 848: 'The established rule is that before an illegal act 
or omission can be held to be contributory negligence it must 
appear that there was caus.al connection between such act or 
omission and the injury, and the mere collateral wrongdoing 
of the plaintiff cannot of itself defeat the right to recover 
where· it did not proximately contribute to the injury.' 
"Counsel have cited us to no authority, and we know of 
none in this State, wherein the doctrine herein enunciated 
has not been followed." 
The fact that Bennett had been crossing the street diag-
onally could not have contributed to the injury in any way. 
The result would have been the same it matters not from 
what direction he approached the point at which he :was 
struck, nor at what angle. We think it equally apparent that 
the fact that he was betwee·n the intersections when struck 
was not a proximate cause of the accident. The driver of 
the car that struck him admittedly did not see him until she 
was within eight feet of him. If she had kept the lookout 
required of her by law, she would have seen him before she 
in fact did. The conclusion that sl1e was not keeping a proper 
lookout cannot be escaped. As she was not looking, the re-
sult 'vould have been the same, as she was driving down the 
center of the street, w·hether Bennett was standing at the 
intersection or fifty feet north of the intersection, or 100 .feet 
north of it. , 
For the foregoing reasons, we confidently take the posi-
tion that the Court should not have held, as a matter of law, 
that Bennett was guilty of contributory negligence; that this 
was a question for the tTury. As already stated, this is 
in our opinion a much stronger case from the standpoint of 
the plaintiff than Green v. R·nffin, in which the Court held 
tl1at the question of contributory neglig-ence was one for the 
determination of the Jury. Here the Court did submit this 
question to the Jury, giving on the subject instructions as 
strong from the standpoint of the defense, in our opinion, as 
have ever been given in the State of Virginia. These instruc-
tions, namely, B, C, D and E are found on pages 103 to 105 
of the transcript of the evidence and incidents of the trial. 
In Instruction "D" the Court told the Jury that the care 
required of a pedestrian crossing between intersections was 
''Greater and higher than that required of the driver or op-
erator of a vehi~le' '. It is true that this language has been 
used in some of the decisions of this Court, but even though 
it may be law, we think we may say of it what the Court has 
often said of abstract statements of the law, that it is calcu-
12 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
lated to confuse and mislead the lav mind. However this 
may be, this instruction, as well as the others referred to 
dealing with the question of contributory negligence, were 
given to the Jury at the request of the defense and the Jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 
This brings us to a discussion of the other principal ques-
tion to be argued, that is 
LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
-The next question to be discussed is this principle of last 
clear chance and its applicability to the facts of this case. 
Judge Gregory in the recent case of J(eele1" v. Boorngard-
ner, 161 Va. 507, said that as so much had been written about 
this principle of last clear chance that, ''Possibly nothing 
could be gained by an attempt to add to what has been said". 
This Court has so often considered the principle that, cer-
tainly, we feel that it is beyond our power· to say anything 
that would materially aid the Court. 
In the Keeler case Judge Gregory stated the principle in 
the following Iang·uage : 
"If from all the evidence the· Jury could reasonably find 
that regardless of the state of negligence of the plaintiff, the 
defendant, by the exercise of ordinary care, had a clear chance 
to save him and failed to do so, then an instruction on the 
doctrine is justified. In cases, such as the one here, where a 
defendant is required by law to keep a proper lookout, the 
test is ·not whether he actually saw the plaintiff in time to 
have saved him, but whether he could have seen him in time 
to have avoided the injury, by exercising ordinary care, and 
failed to do so. '' 
The language just quoted was used in a case the facts of 
which were almost identical 'vith the instant case. This case 
will be referred to later. 
In Bassett v. TVood, 146 ""\T a. 654, 664, the principle is stated 
in this language : 
"If after the defendant knew, or in the exercise of or-
dinary care ought to have known, of the negligence of the 
plaintiff it could have avoided the accident but failed to do 
so, the plaintiff can recover.'' 
Number less other quotations to the same effect might be 
given from the decisions of this Court. We feel, however, 
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that this is unnece~sary. "\Ve have used these two quotations 
for the reason that they were taken from cases in which the 
facts were almost identical with the instant case. 
The instructions requested by the plaintiff and given by 
the Court on the principle of last clear chance is No. P-5 
and found on page 99 of the transcript of the evidence. We 
think that this instruction correctly states the law. In our 
opinion it put a heavier burden on the plaintiff than was re-
quired of him in the cases just referred to. The defense 
objected to this instruction on the ground that it was not 
applicable to the facts of this case, and on the further g-round 
that it was ''Not a correct statement of the principle of last 
clear chance", but it did not point out in what r-espect the 
instruction failed to correctly state that principle, although 
asked to do so. In view of the decisions of this Court, we 
feel that there can be no doubt but that this instruction did 
correctly state the doctrine. 
The real objection made to Instruction P-5 by the defense 
and the reason given by the Court for setting aside the ver-
dict of the Jury was that this principle of last clear chance 
was not applicable to the facts of this case. Although the 
facts have already been stated, we feel that in discusing this 
question it is necessary to restate such of them as we rely 
on in support of our contention that the principle of last 
clear chance is a proper and necessary part of' this case. 
The deceased, Bennett, shortly before the accident, accom-
panied by Fourqueran, started across from the west to the 
east side of l\iain Street, crossing the street diagonally and 
at a point about fifty feet north of the intersection of Main 
and Bank Streets. When the two offic·ers reached the cen-
ter of the street they stopped to discuss the matter of having 
a traffic light at the intersection about fifty feet south of therp. 
Wl1ile they were discussing this question, a car ~ccn ied by 
the witnesses Booker and Snead approached them rom the 
south and one of the offlcers signalled to the car o proceed. 
After this car had passed, Fourqueran continued across Main 
Street, but Bennett remained 'in the center of the street, still 
talking to Fourqueran. Bennett was standing in the center 
of the street fac.ing· south with his arms and hands raised 
and pointing· up and forward in the direction of the proposed 
traffic light. While Bennett was standing in this position 
talking to Fourqueran, the defendant's car, to which he had 
his back turned, approached him from the north and collided 
with l1im, the right front part of the car striking· the deceas~d 
in his back, breaking several ribs 'vhere they joined the back-
bone. Bennett was standing in the position stated when 
the car occupied by Booker and Snead passed them and there-
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after until Fourqueran could walk fro~ the middle of the 
street to the sidewalk on the east side of Main Street, a dis-
tance of twenty-two feet. · It was clearly proved that the 
street was well lighted and that although it was raining slight-
ly the visibility was good. The 'vitness Nolen testified, 
and his testimony was not contradicted, that the driver of 
defendant's car could have without trouble seen Mr. Bennett 
several hundred feet before reaching him. 
If we put the rate of speed of defe·nda.nt 's car at about 
twenty miles per hour, as she testified to it, the deceased 
must have been standing in the middle of the street 'vhen 
her car was at last a hundred feet from him. If the rate of 
speed is put at thirty to thirty-five miles an hour, as testi-
fied to by Fourqueran, then the distance 1nust have been 
greater. In addition, deceased was in full view of the de-
fendant while he 'vas 'valking from the west sidewalk to the 
center of the street. During- this time the car must have 
proceeded 75 to 100 feet. The defendant driver of the car 
testified that she first sa'v l\:fr. Bennett when her car was 
within eight feet of him and that the·n in an effort to avoid 
striking him she turned her car to the right. It was, of 
course, too late when she was within eight feet of him to 
avoid the accident. The test, however, as stated by Judge 
Gregory, in the I<:eeler case, is "Not whether he (she) ac-
tually saw the plaintiff in time to have saved him, but whether 
he (she) could have seen him''. In view of the fact that 
Bennett had been standing in the position he occupied while 
defendant's car was travelling one hundred to one hundred 
and fifty feet, according to the evidence "re take as to its rate 
of speed, and the further fact that the visibility was ~ood and 
the driver of this car could have seen him throughout the 
time that she was driving this distance, it seems clear to us 
that the principle of last clear chance does apply. In thiH 
connection it must be remembered that deceased had his back 
to the approaching car, with his arms and hands raised point-
ing up and forward, talking to Fourqueran. Had the de-
fendant seen Bennett in this position it must have been clear 
to her that he was una-ware of his danger. 
The facts of this case so far as they are material are, in 
our opinion, identical with those of J(eeler v. Ba~tmgardner, 
s~tpra. In the Keeler case the Plaintiff was crossing Ma.in 
Street of the City of Wytheville diagonally and between in-
tersections at about 6:30 P. M. ,vhen it 'vas dark. It was rain-
in@: slig·htly but not enoug·h to materially interfere with the 
visibility of the driver of a car. The width of this ~fain 
Street, if we exclude the space occupied by parked cars, was 
about forty feet. After the Plaintiff had gotten most of 
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the way across the street, defenda:nt's car which was ap-
proaching him from the rear, ran into him from behind and 
<!aused the injuries complained of. Under these facts the 
Trial Court, at the request of plaintiff, gave an instruction 
on the pri:nciple of last clear chance, and the Jury returned 
a verdict for the plaintiff. The Trial Court, as in the instant 
case, later concluded that this instruction should not have 
been given and therefore set aside the verdict. The only 
question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the 
principle of last clear chance applied to the facts as stated 
and the Court in an unanimous opinion held that it did, 
The only point of difference between the instant case and 
the Keeler case is that in the instant case it was proved that 
the headlights on the defendant's car were burning, whereas, 
the J( eeler case was decided on the assumption that the head-
lights on the defendant's were not burning. This is the 
only distinction that opposing counsel made in arguing the 
instant case, and it is the distinction made by the Trial Court 
when it declined to follow the Keeler case. In our opinion 
this difference is not material; as in both cases there was 
sufficient illumination to enable the driver of the car to see 
tlw pedestrian; but if it is material then it is in our favor 
and ·not against us, as certainly the driver of a car whose 
lights are burning has a better chance to see a pedestrian in 
n street than the driver of a car whose lights are not burn-
ing. In the Keeler case the Court recognized that had the 
lights of the defendant's car been burning· the Plaintiff would 
have had a stronger case so far as the principle of last clear 
chance was concerned. \Ve quote from page 514 of that case: 
''If it were dark and her lights were not burning and the 
other artificial light did not fully illuminate the street, then 
the Jury could have concluded from the physical facts and 
the testimony that she could have seen him by the exercise 
of ordinary care a safe distance away and could have avoided 
striking l1im.'' 
. We think that t.he evidence in this case abundantly shows, 
1n fact leaves no doubt, but that the driver of the defendant's 
car could have seen Bennett when she was one hundred feet 
or more away from him. There can be no question about 
the fact that it was her duty to keep a careful lookout, nor 
can there be any question of the fact that had she seen him 
'vhen she could and should have done so she could easily have 
avoided the accident by either bringing her car to a stop or 
guiding it to the right. There was at least twenty feet of 
Main Street to the right of Bennett that was not occupied 
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by any other car or any other pedestrians and there was noth. 
ing to prevent the defendant, had she seen Bennett when the 
duty was on her to do so, to guide .her car to this part of the 
street. In fact, it was the part of the street that the law re-
quired her to occupy. 
Bassett v. Wood, 146 Va. 654, is another case directly in 
point. In the Bassett case the Plaintiff 'vas struck by an an 
tomobile while she was crossing a street in the City of Nor-
folk. One of the defenses made was that the Plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory neg·ligence and in support of this de-
fense. evidence was introduced that ::Mrs. Wood when she 
was struck by the automobile was crossing· the street diag-
onally and at a point between i·ntersections. The Court in-
structed the Jury on the question of the primary neglig-ence 
of the defendant and also the alleged contributory negligence 
of the Plaintiff and also gave an instruction on the principl() 
of last clear chance. As in this case, the Court modified 
the instl"1lctions offered by the defense on ·the question of 
contributory negligence so as to make them harmonize with -
the instruction given on last clear chance. The modification 
made to these instructions was in exactly the same language 
as that used by the Trial Court in the instant case in modify-
ing instructions B, C and E, offered hy the defense. In the 
Bassett case the Court held that the facts justified an instruc-
tion on the principle of the last clear chance, and. it approved 
the modification or addition made to the defendant's instrnc-
. tions. In speaking of these amendments or additions to the 
defendant's instructions, the Court said: 
''These instructions, if they had been unamended, 'vould 
have been misleading to the Jury under the evidence ~ancl cir-
cumstances of this case. While to the trained legal mind per-
haps the phrase 'proximate cause' excluded her negligence 
as the remote c.ause of her injury as an element which 'vould 
bar recovery. However, to the lay mind these instruction8 
meant that if she was negligent and the driver of the truck 
was negligent, there could be no recovery. That is, as stated 
by Bassett in extenuation of negligence, if she was 'Jay walk-
ing' he owed her no -duty of prevision. This is not the la,v. '' 
In this case also the Court pointed out that the test was 
not whether the driver of the car could have avoided the acci-
dent after he actually saw the plaintiff, but whether he could 
have avoided the accident after he, in the exercise of reason-
. able care, should have seen the plaintiff. 
· The facts of the two cases just referred to are, in our opin. 
ion, in all material respects identical with the facts of the 
J. G. Bennett, Adm.r., etc., v. Eliz. Spencer, et al. 17 
instant case. In our experience we have neyer in any neg-
ligence case had the good fortlme to find an authority as di-
rectly in point as is Keeler v. Boon~gardner. vVe think these 
cases conclusive of the question here presented. 
The defense relied on a line of cases of which Stephen Put-
ney Company v. Or·msby's .t{ldtn., 129 Va. 297; lJ!leade v. Saun-
ders, 151 Va. 636; Sawnders v. 1'wmple, 154 Va. 714; Pa;ytes 
v. Davis, 156 Va. 229, are fair samples. These cases, of course, 
can be readily distinguished from the instant case. For in-
stance, in the Onnsby case the defendant stepped from the 
side,valk into a city street dir:ectly in front of the car which 
struck him. Of course under these circumstances the driver 
of the car had no opportunity to avoid the accident. 
In Meade v. Ba~tnders, Plaintiff before he left the sidewalk 
to cross the street, saw the car which later struck him. Not-
withstanding this fact, without again looking, he continued 
across the street and walked into the side of the car toward 
its rear. These facts bear· no resen1blance whatever to the 
instant case. 
· In Sattnders v. 1'mnple, in view of the fact that the Plaintiff 
was unable to give any intelligent account of how the acci-
dent happened, the Court. accepted the theory of the defense, 
which 1vas to the effect that Plaintiff was not in the line of 
vision of the d'river of the car until he stepped suddenly in 
front of it. We would not contend that under these facts the 
principle of last clear chance applied. 
In Paytes v. Davis, the Court said that it was proven that 
the plaintiff suddenly stepped in front of the defendant's 
car and that there was nothing in his appearance to lead the 
driver of that car to anticipate that he intended to do so. The 
facts on \vhich this case was decided are altogether different 
from the instant case. 
We fully recognize the fact that no instruction should be 
given on this principle of last clear .chance unless there is 
evidence to support it; tl1at the application of this principle 
should never be left to surmise or speculation. We confidently 
submit, however, that the evidence in this case, 've think that 
we can say the uncontradicted evidence, amply justified the in-
. struction. "r e, therefore, submit that the action of the Court 
in setting aside the verdict of the Jury was erroneous and 
that the verdict should now be reinstated. 
We have discussed this case as if there were only one de-
fendant, Elizabeth Spencer, the driver of the car that struck 
and killed deceased. Thomas M. Spencer, the father of Eliza-
beth Spencer, and the owner of said car, 1vas also proceeded 
against as a defendant. He was· proceeded against on the 
theory that under the facts of this case the ''Family Purpose 
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Doctrine'', as announced in the recent case of Baptist v . .Slate, 
162 Va. 1, applied. The Trial Court so held and we think 
this ruling '\Vas plainly right. 
CONCLUSION. 
We have undertaken to discuss in this Petition the two 
questions raised by the final action of the Trial Court. 
We submit that this was a proper case for the application 
of the principle of last clear chance. As already pointed 
out, we think that the very recent case of J(eeler v. Baum-
gardne'l· is controlling. The facts of the Keeler case do 'not 
differ in any material respect from the facts in the instant 
case, and if the principle applied in the Keeler case, we are 
confident in our position that it should apply here. 
However, should the Court be of the O}Jinion that this was 
not a case for the application of the principle of last clear 
chance, we then submit that the Trial Court should not have 
entered up final judgment for the defendants, hut should 
have ordered a new trial, so that the question of the alleged 
contributory negligence of the deceased could have been 
passed on by a jury. On this poi'nt we are fortunate in hav-
ing such direct authority as Green v. Ruffin. The reasoning 
of Green v. R'ltffin is conclusive, and few, if any, cases de-
cided by this Court in recent years have been more often 
cited with approval. 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner prays that a writ of 
error and S'ltpersedea-s be granted him and that the judgment 
of the Trial Court be reviewed and reversed. 
Counsel for Petitioner desire to present orally reasons why 
a writ of error and su.tJersedeas should be allowed, and they 
desire to have this petition considered as their brief provided 
such a writ is allowed. 
A copy of this petition was mailed to McKinney and Settle, 
at South Boston, Virginia, opposing counsel, on the 7th day 
of November, 1935. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GORDON BENNETT, 
Administrator of W. R. Bennett, Deceased. 
By: ~fAR TIN & TUCK, Counsel. 
M~RTIN & TUCK, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
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We, the undersigned attorneys at law practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in our 
opinion the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition 
should be reviewed and reversed by said Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under our hands this 7th day of November, 1935. 
JOifN MARTIN, 
W. M. TUCK. 
Received Nov. 9, 1935. 
M. B. W. 
Nov. 20, 1935. Writ of error and supersedeas ~warded by 
M. B·. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable N. S. Turnbull, Jr., Judge 
of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, at the Courthouse 
thereof on Thursday, September lOth, 1935. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Va., on th0 
12th day of July, 1935, J. Gordon Bennett, Administrator of 
William R. Bennett, deceased, filed his notice of motion 
against Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spencer, which 
notice is in the following 'vords and figures, to-wit: 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
page 2 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. · 
.J. Gordon Bennett, Administrator of the Estate of William 
R. Bennett, Deceased, 
v. 
Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas 1YI. Spencer. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUD·GMENT. 
To Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spencer: 
TAKE NOTICE, that I shall on Monday, September 2, 
1935, or as soon thereafter as I may be heard, move the Cir-
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cuit .Court of Halifax County, Virginia, at the Courthouse 
thereof, for a judgment and award of execution against you 
and each of you for the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) 
Dollars, which amount is due and owing by you to the un-
dersigned Administrator of William R. Bennett, deceased, 
by reason of and on account of the following facts, as here-
inafter more particularly set forth, to-wit: 
Heretofore, to-wit, on the 23rd day of January, 1935, at to-
wit: 7:15 o'clock P. ~L of that day, you, Elizabeth Spencer, 
were driving a certain Chevrolet Sedan Auto1nobile along 
lower ~Iain Street in South Boston, an incorporated town 
in Halifax Qounty, Virginia, towards the intersection of l\Iain 
and Banks Streets in said town. Said Main Street at said 
point runs in approximately a north and south direction and 
is forty feet wide. Yon, Elizabeth Spencer, were driving 
said automobile in a southerly direction, approaching the said 
intersection of said Main and Bank Streets from the north. 
Main Street for a long distance, to-wit, 300 yards north of 
said intersection, is straight and the view of one approaching 
from the north the scene of the accident hereinafter de-
scribed is and was at the time of said accident clear and un-
obstructed for said distance. .As the said automobile op-
erated by you, Elizabeth Spencer, approached the said in-
tersection the said William. R. Bennett, deceased, was stand-
ing at or near the ce·nter of 1\{ain Street, near said 
page 3 ~ intersection, facing in a southerly direction, in the 
discharge and performance of his duties as Chief 
of Police of the Town of South Boston, that is, inspecting 
the traffic conditions at that point, which was a business dis-
trict. 
It thereupon became and was the duty of you, Elizabeth 
Spencer: 
(1) To drive said automobile at a reasonable speed under 
the circumstances and traf.fic conditions obtaining at the 
time. 
(2) To keep a careful lookout for pedestrians who might 
be in said street, and to give them timely warning of the ap-
proach of said automobile. 
(3) To drive said automobile on the right half of said 
street. 
(4) To drive said automobile at a speed and in a manner, 
so as not to endanger or be likely to endanger life, limb or 
property. : , 
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(5) To keep said automobile under such control as not to 
injure or endanger said Bennett. 
(6) To guide said automobile to the right, so as not to 
strike said Bennett. 
You, said Elizabeth Spencer, did not discharge the duties 
imposed on you as aforesaid, but, on the other hand, wrong-
fully an~ negligently. failed to discharge each and every one 
of said duties in that 
(1) You drove your said automobile at an unlawful, un-
reasonable and dangerous rate of speed in yiew of the cir-
cumstances and traffic conditions, this being a business dis-
trict. 
(2) You failed to keep a careful lookout for pedestrians, and 
failed to give timely warning of your approach. 
(3) You failed to drive said automobile on the right half 
of said street. 
( 4) You drove said automobile in a manner and at a rate 
. of speed as endangered life, limb and property, especially said 
Bennett. 
( 5) you failed to keep said automobile under proper con-
trol. 
( 6) On approaching said Bennett, although there was ample 
room on the right half of the street for you to drive your 
car, you guided and drove it to the left and struck said Ben-
nett. 
pag·e 4 ~ As a direct ·and proximate result of your negli-
gent and wrongful acts aforesaid, the automobile 
driven by you, Elizabeth Spencer, ran into and against said 
William R. Bennett inflicting upon him wounds and injuries 
from which be on the 29th day of January, 1935, died. 
Said automobile so operated by you, Elizabeth Spencer, at 
the time and place aforesaid, belonged to you, Thomas M. 
Spencer, who purchased and maintained the saic} automobile 
for the convenience, pleasure and use of your family, and the 
members of your family, especially Elizabeth Spencer, your 
daughter, were permitted to use it at will. You, Elizabeth 
Spencer, were using said automobile at the time of the afore-
said accident, w·ith the knowledge and consent of you, said 
Thomas M. Spencer, for the purpose for which said automo-
bile was purchased and maintained by you. 
At the time of the aforesaid accident, the said Elizabeth 
· Spencer was the agent and servant of you, the said Thomas 
M·. Spencer, and w·as acting and engaged in the discharge of 
her duties as such. : 
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By reason whereof, and as the proximate result of which, 
the undersigned has been damaged by you,. Elizabeth Spencer, 
and you, Thomas ~1:. Spencer, to the extent of Ten Thousand 
($10,000.00) Dollars, which sum is due the undersigned by 
you. 
Wherefore, judgment therefor will be asked at the hands 
of said court at the time and place hereinbefore set forth for 
said sum of $10,000.00. 
The undersig·ned is the duly appointed, qualified and act-
ing· administrator of the estate of the said William R. Ben-
nett, deceased. 
Given under my hand this lOth day of July__, 1935. 
Respectfully, 
J. GORDON BENNET1:, 
Administrator of the Estate of William 
R. Bennett, Deceased. 
By: ~fAR TIN & TUCK, Counsel. 
MARTIN & TUCK, p. q. 
SHERIFF'S RETURN SHOWING SERVICE ON DE-
FENDANTS. 
I executed the within writ on the 11th day of July, 1935, 
by delivering a true copy thereof to Elizabeth Spencer & 
Thomas N. Spencer in person in Halifax County, Y a. 
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G. R. NOLEN, 
Deputy Sheriff for J. Add Tunef Sheriff of 
Halifax County, Va. 
. August 5th (1st August Rules: On motion of 
the plaintiff by counsel, it is ordered that M. B. Hooker be 
and he is hereby appointed as guardian ad litern, of the infant 
defendant Elizabeth Spencer. 
1935 
E. C. LACY, Clerk. 
By JAS. H. MEDLEY, 
Deputy Cleric 
1st August R.ules: Answer of the infant defendant Eliza-
beth Spencer filed at rules by M. B. Hooker, her guardian ad 
litem, general replication thereto and cause set for hearing 
thereupon as to her. 
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ANSWER OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM. 
The Answer of Elizabeth Spencer who being infant an-
swers by M. B. Booker, her guardian ad Litem, appointed to 
defend her interests in a certain suit now pending at rules 
in the Clerk's Office of Halifax Circuit Court wherein they 
are parties defendants and J. Gordan Bennett, Admr. of 
Wm. R. Bennett, is party plaintiff. These respondents sav-
ing and rese1·ving, &c., for answer to the bill of said com-
plainants, or to so much thereof as they are advised it is ma-
terial for them to answer, say that being infants under 21 
years of age, they can neither admit nor deny the several 
allegations in said bill of complaint contained, but submit 
their rights and interests to the protection of the court. And 
having answered fully, they pray to be hence dismissed with 
their costs, &c. 
ELIZABETH SPENCER, 
By M. B. BOOKER, 
Her Guardian ad litem. 
page 5 }- And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
held for the County of Halifax at the Courthouse 
thereof on Monday, September 2d, 1935, the following order 
was entered: 
J. Gordan Bennett, Admr. of W. R. Bennett, decd"J Plaintiff, 
v. 
Elizabeth and Thos. M. Spencer, Defendants. 
ON A NOTJCE OF MOTION FOR DAMAGES. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys and on motion 
of the plaintiff by counsel~ it is ordered that the defendants 
file the grounds o£ their defense to this motion not later than 
September 4th, 1935, at 10 o'clock A. M. 
GROUNDS Of DEFEN·SE FILED SEPTEMBER 4TH, 
1935. 
page 6 r Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County . 
• J. Gordon Bennett, Adm'r of W. R. Bennett 
v. 
Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spencer. 
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GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defendants, Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spen-
cer, rely upon the following grounds of defense in this action, 
to-wit: · 
(1) The defendants deny the alleged breaches of duty set 
forth in paragraphs 1 to 6, inclusive, O'n page 2 of the notice 
of motion. 
(2) The proximate cause of the injury was the contributory 
· negligence of the plaintiff's intestate, W. R. Bennett. This 
contributory negligence consisted in his standing in the street 
in the area ordinarily used by automobiles without keeping a 
proper lookout in the direction in which the defendant's car 
was coming and by turning· his face in the opposite direction, 
and thereby violating the duty imposed upon him as a pe-
destrian to keep a proper lookout for his own safety; and 
also by crossing at a place other than a street intersection. 
(3) The members of the family of the defendant Thomas 
M. Spencer, including the defendant Elizabeth Spencer, were 
not permitted to use the said automobile at will, and said au-
tomobile was not maintained by the defendant Thomas M. 
Spencer in such manner as to bring its use within the doc-
trine commonly. known as the ''family purpose doctrine'', and 
that the said Spencer was not liable for the acts of his said 
daughter in the case complained of. . 
(4) The defendant Elizabeth Spencer was not the agent 
and servant of the defendant Thomas lVL Spencer, and was 
not acting and engaged in the discharge of her duties as 
such. . 
(5) It is denied that the defendant Elizabeth Spencer neg-
ligently or recklessly operated said automobile, or violated 
the law in the use thereof at the time of the accident, but 
even if she was guilty of violating any duty im-
page 7 ~ posed upon her by law, such violation was not the 
· proximate cause of the injury. 
(6) The plaintiff's intestate, V•l. R. Bennett, after the ac-
cident admitted his own neg·ligence at the time thereof. 
(7) The defendants will also plead the general issue, a:ncl 
rely upon such other facts as may be provable thereunder. 
Filed in the Clerk's Office September 4, 1935. · 
Teste: 
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Afndavit filed by Thomas M. Spencer, September 5th,. 
1935. 
AFFID.A. VIT. 
page 8 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
AFFID.A. VIT OF THOMAS M. SPENCER, FILED SEPT. 
6th, 1935. 
J. Gordon Bennett, Adm 'r Wm. R. Bennett, 
v. 
Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas ~I. Spencer. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Halifax, to-wit: 
I, Thomas M. Spencer, one of the defendants in a notice of 
motion for judgment brought in said court by J. Gordon 
Bennett, Administrator of the estate of William R. Be'nllett, 
deceased, being duly sworn, say that at the time of the acci-
dent and injury complained of, to-,vit: On. January 23, 1935, 
at 7:15 o'clock P. M. of that day, the affiant, Thomas · M. 
Spencer, did not operate or control the automobile ,which was 
at that time bei·ng driven and operated by the defendant 
Elizabeth Spencer, and that the said Elizabeth Spencer at the 
time of the said accident. 'vas not operating the said auto-
mobile as the agent or servant of the affiant, Thomas 1\L 
Spencer, nor in the discharge of her duties as such agent or 
servant of the affiant. 
Given under my hand this the 5th day of September, 1935. 
THOl\.fAS M. SPENCER. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public for 
the County of Halifax, Va., in the said county, by the affiant, 
Thomas 1\f. Spencer, this the 5th day of September, 1935. 
W. B. SETTLE. 
Notary Public. 
1\fy commission expires March 16th, 1935. 
Ple·a of Contributory N eg·ligence, filed Sept. 6th, 1935. 
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In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
J. Go~·don Bennett, Adm'r of W. R. Bennett, 
v. 
Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas 1\II. Spencer. 
PLEA OF CONTRIBUTORY NE,GLIGENCE. 
The defendants, Thomas ~I. Spencer and Elizabeth Spen-
cer, an infant, by J\L B. Booker, her Guardian Ad Litem, co~e 
and say that they are not liable in the manner and form as 
' the plaintiff against them in his notice of motion hath ai. 
leged, for the ;reason that the plaintiff's intestate, W. R. Ben-
nett, was at the time of the alleged negligence of the defend-
ants guilty of neglig·ence which proximately contributed to 
his injury, to-wit: That the said intestate walked in to and 
was in the act of crossing Main Street of the town of South 
Boston at a point considerably north of the intersection of 
Main Street and Bank Street, and did not keep a proper look-
out for approaching vehicles, but turned his face from the di-
rection in which defendant's car was coming, and thus heed-
~essly exposed hifl?.self to danger; the time of the accident be-
ing at night; and further tl1at the said decedent Bennett vio-
lated the law at the time of the accident by walking or stand-
ing in the street without keeping as near as reasonably pos-
sible to the extreme left side or edge of the same, and there 
being sidewalks on both the east and west sides of said street 
on which the decedent could have walked; and the said de-
cedent crossed or undertook to cross the street diagonally. 
Filed 9/6/35. 
THOMAS M. SPENCER. 
By: McKINNEY & SETTLE, 
His Attorneys. 
ELIZABETH SPENCER, 
By: M. B. BOOKER, 
Her Guardian Ad Litem. 
By: McKINNEY & SETTLE, 
His Attorneys. 
E. C. LACY, Clerk. 
/ 
/ 
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page 10 r And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
held and continued for the County of Halifax, at 
the Courthouse thereof, on Friday, September 6th, 1935, the 
following· order was entered: 
J. Gordan Bennett, Admr., of vVilliam R. Bennett, deceased, 
\ v. 
\ Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spencer. 
\ 
'\ 
\ On motion of the plaintiff by counsel, M. B. Booker is here-
by appointed Guardian acl litMn for the infant defendant. 
Elizabeth Spencer. 
And at the same day, at said Circuit Court for Halifax 
County, Va., held at the Courthouse of said County, on said 
September 6th, 193.5, the following order was entered, which 
order is in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
page 11} Present the Honorable N. S. Turnbull, Jr., Judge 
Presiding. 
J. Gordan Bennett, Administrator of William R. Bennett, 
deceased, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spencer, Defendants. 
FOR DANIAGES ON A NOTICE OF MOTION. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys as well as 
lvi. B. Booker, Guardian ad lite1n, in person as well as by his 
attorneys, and the defendants as well as M. B. Booker, Guar-
dian ad litmn for the infant defendant Elizabeth Spencer by 
their attorneys say they are not guilty in manner and form 
as the plaintiff in his notice of motion hath alleged and of 
this they put themselves upon the· Country and the plain-
tiff doth the like, and the defendant Thomas M. Spencer and 
said 1\L B. Booker, Guardian aa litem of Elizabeth Spencer, 
by counsel; filed their plea of Contributory Negligence and 
put themselves upon the country and the plaintiff doth the 
like, and the defendant Thomas M. Spencer filed his sworn 
affidavit in this cause, and it furth.er appearing that the de-
fendants by counsel filed on September 4th, 1935, their 
grounds· of defense to this suit in pursuance of a former 
order of this Court. Thereupon came a jury, to-wit: Thorn-
ton Gravitt, J. G. Bradshaw, B. W. Smith, C. B. Compton, 
T. I. Crews, W. J. Cassada and J. K. Landrum, who were 
summoned, selected, qualified and sworn in the manner pre-
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scribed by law and after hearing the evidence of witnesses 
were adjourned oyer until tomorrow morning at ten o'clock. 
page 12 }- And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
. held and continued for the County of Halifax, at 
the Courthouse thereof on Saturday, the 7th day of Sep-
tember, 1935, the following order was entered 'vhich order J 
is in the following words and figures, to-wit: / 
' 
J. Gordan Bennett, Administration of William R. Bennett, f 
deceased, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas ]\{~ Spencer, Defendants. 
ON NOTICE OF J\1:0TION FOR DAMAGES. 
This day came ag·ain the parties by their attorneys, there-
upon can1e the jury adjourned over on yesterday pursuant 
to their adjournment, to-,vit: Thornton Gravitt, J. G. 
Bradshaw, B. W. Smith, C. B. Compton, T. I. Crews, N. J. 
Cassada, and J. K. Landrum, who having heard the argument 
of counsel retired to their room to consult of a verdict and 
after some time came in Court and rendered the following 
verdict, to-wit; "We the Jury find for the Plaintiff against 
both defendants & assess the damages at Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000.00) all of which after the payment of costs 
and reasonable counsel fees shall be paid to 1\{rs. Rosa Lee 
Bennett widow of W. R. Bennett'' B. W. Smith, Foreman. 
Here the defendants moved the Court to set aside the afore-
said verdict of the jury and to enter a judgment for the de-
fendants upon the grounds that the verdict is contrary to_ 
the law and the evidence, is against the evidence and without 
evidence to support it; for misdirection of the jury in the 
granting· of instructio·ns P-1, P-2, P-3, P-5, P-6 and P-11, of-
fered by the plaintiff, and objected to by the defendants, and 
for the refusal of the Court to grant instructions A, G & H, 
offered by the defendants, and for amending instructions B, 
C and E offered by the defendants; for action of the Court 
in overruling motion of the defendants to strike the plain-
tiff's evidence; for admission of evidence objected to by the 
defendants, and for the exclusion of evidence offered by the 
defendants as shown by the record; and other errors appear-
. ing from the record. Of which motion the Court 
page 13 }- not being advised of its judgment takes further 
. time to co·nsider and will hear argument of coun-
sel for and against on Tuesday, September 10th, 1935. 
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.And at another day, to-wit: .At a Circuit Court held and 
continued for the County of Halifax at the Courthouse there-
on Tuesday, the lOth day of September, 1935, the following 
judgment was entered being the day :first herein mentioned, 
which judgment is in the following words and figures, to-
wit: 
page 14 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Sepetmber lOth, 1935. 
J. Gordon Bennett, .A.dmr. of W. R. Bennett, Dec 'd., 
v. 
Thomas ~L Spencer and Elizabeth Spencer. 
ORDER. 
This day came ag·ain the parties by counsel and argued 
the motion heretofqre made to set aside the verdict of the_ 
jury and enter final judgment for the defendants. Upon con-
sideration whereof, the Court wit4out passing upon other 
matters stated in the motion to set aside the verdict of the 
jury, is of opinion that the plaintiff's intestate .has shown, as 
decided by the verdict of the jury that the defendants were 
guilty of primary negligence; and that it has also been shown 
that the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence which 
continued up to the moment of the accident and concurred ~n 
causing· his injuries and death, and that this is not a proper 
case for submission to the jury on the doctrine of the last 
clear chance. Therefore, the court doth set aside the ver-
dict of the jury, and doth render final judgment for th~ de-
fendants, and doth order that the defendants do recover of 
the plaintiffs their costs by them about their suit in this be-
half expended. To the action of the court in setting aside 
the verdict of the jury the plaintiff by counsel excepts, and 
it is ordered that execution of this judgment be suspended 
for a period of ninety days, to afford the plaintiff an op-
portunity to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Va. 
for a writ of error from this judgment, if he be so advised, 
without bond. 
EVIDENCE, &C. 
page 1 ~In the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Virginia .. 
J. Gordon Bennett, Administrator of the Estate of William 
R. Bennett, deceased, .. 
v. 
Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spencer. 
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StenogTaphic report of tcstin1ony and other incidents of 
the trial of the cause of J. Gordon Bennett, administrator of 
the estate of William R. Bennett, deceased, v. Elizabeth Spen-
cer and Thomas 1\tf. Spencer, before Ron. N. S. Turnbull, 
Judge, and a Jury, in the Circuit Court of I-Ialifax County, 
which trial began on September 6, 1935, and there were pres-
ent 1\fessrs. :Martin and Tuck for ~he plaintiff, 1\{essrs. 1\{c-
Kinney and Settle for the defendant and 1\tir. M. B. Booker, 
g~ardian ad lite1n for the infant defendant, Elizabeth Spen-
cer. 
Be it Remembered that the plaintiff, to maintain the issue 
on his part, introduced the following testimony: 
page 2 ~ Mr. l\1:. B. Booker, guardian ad litem for the in-
fant defendant, Elizabeth Spencer, appeared in 
person, as did the said Elizabeth Spencer, and by counsel filed 
·the plea of the general issue and also a special plea of con-
. tributory negligence, and counsel for the defendant, Thomas 
M. Spencer filed a plea of the general issue, a plea of con-
tributory neg·ligence and an affidavit of the defendant, 
Thomas M. Spencer, that he did not operate or control the au-
tomobile at the time. 
E. R. FARMER, 
having been first duly sworn, testified on behalf of the plain-
·tiff as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. Mr. Farmer, I believe you are a civil engineer"! 
A. Yes, sir. 
-Q. And have been in engaged in that business for ho'v 
long? 
A. Oh, for about forty or fifty years. 
Q. You are the County Surveyor of Halifax County? 
~. Yes, sir. · 
Q. South Boston, I believe, is in Halifax County? 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
-Q. Did you comparatively recently have occasion to make 
a map showing 1\fain ·Street in South Boston and 
page 3 ~ that part of Main Street near the intersection of 
Bank Street with 1\fain Street? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. Is this the map that you made? You might look at this 
one and then you can get out your own. 
A. Yes, sir, that is a blueprint of the tracing that I have 
hera · 
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Q. Is this a blueprint of the original map you· made 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does this map accurately represent that part of Main 
Street in South Boston that it purports to represent 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Drawn to scale 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you got a copy of it in your hand 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You might get it out while I hold this and you hold 
the other copy. I believe this map shows that Main Street 
where it intersects with Bank Street, and for some di.stance 
north and south of that intersection, is forty-four feet wide 7 
A. Forty-four feet between the curbs. 
Q. From curb to curb f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And on each side of that Main Street it shows there is 
a. sidewalk7 
page 4 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what is the width of that sidewalk? 
A. Ten feet. 
Q. On each side f 
A. There are some points on the eastern side that the old 
building·s are not exactly in li'ne and it is a little less than 
ten feet but very little. 
Q. I don't think that is material. All of it is approximately 
ten feet wide? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This map that I have shows that Main Street for some 
distance south of the intersection with B·ank Street and for 
~t least two blocks north is straight? 
A. Perfectly straight, yes, sir. 
Q. Is it level? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Down grade? 
A. Leading from what is known as the Big Four Corner 
toward the Southern station is do·wn grade all the way. . 
Q. That is the grade leads south 7 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just a moderate grade? 
A. Yes, sir, it is not a steep grade. 
Q. Could you tell us what it is approximately? 
A. Well, for most of the way between the two 
page 5 ~ blocks, from Bank Street to Charles Street, it is at 
one point about three per cent and the other about 
two per cent. 
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Q. At this point the grade is between two and three per 
oontY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I notice on this map you show the buildings on each 
side of Main Street for a considerable distance. Are they 
business buildings, stores and other business buildings t 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
Mr. Martin: I believe we admit, 1\!Ir. McKinney, this was 
a business district. 
Mr. McKinney: Yes. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. You have indicated on this map, I notice, a place south 
of the intersection of ~fain and Bank Streets-you have got 
a star marked "City Light" 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then north of that intersection on the same side of 
the street about the middle of the block you have another 
City Light mark and then you have got a city light mark at 
· the intersection of Main and Bank Streets Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, I want to ask you this : Wherever you 
have got the words "City Light" on this· map was there at 
the time of this accident in January of this year a 
page 6 ~ city light? 
A. Yes, sir, that was an iron pole that the city 
lights have been o~ for a number of years. 
Q. They are electric lights f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Of course, you weren't present at the time of this acci-
dent? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are there any obstructions in Main Street in the part 
that vehicles are supposed to travel in-! mean permanent 
obstructions, monuments or anything of that kind, .at this 
intersection that I have been asking you about or north or 
south of it for a considerable distance f 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. I will ask you to file that map with your evidence as an 
exhibit and ask the stenographer to identify it. 
A. I will file it. 
Note: This m::~n was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
Q. This map correctly locates Bank Street, shows just how· 
Bank Street intersects with Main StreetY 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In fact I understand that the whole map is correct f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 7 }- CROSS EXAlVIINATION. 
By Mr. McKinney: · 
Q. Mr. Farmer, on this map you do not indicate any park 
ing lines as they are drawn on the street, do you Y 
. A. Indicate what? 
Q. Parking lines. 
A. No, sir, I didn't show them. 
Q. When was this map made approximately Y 
A. I think it is dated.· 
Q. August 19, 1935. Did you make any measurements at 
the time of making this map as to how far out in the street 
the parking lines extend from the curb 7 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Is it a parallel parking line or diagonal parking stripe Y 
A. I think on the west side of the street there is a parallel 
parking line and on this· side diagonal. 
Q. But you took no measurements of that and it doesn't 
show on your mapY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You can't say how far that line is from the curb! 
A. No, sir. 
page 8 }- RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. ~{artin : 
Q. Can you tell us approximately how far that line is from 
the curb? 
· A. Well, sir, it is supposed to be the length of an ordinary 
passenger car. . 
· Q. Length or the width Y • 
A. The width or the length. 
E. H. SNEAD, 
having been first duly sworn, testified on behalf of the plain-
tiff as follows: 
Examined by Mr. ~{artin: 
Q. You are Mr. E: H. Snead? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe for ·a number of years you tauglit school in 
South Boston? · · · 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now you work in the A B C store in South Boston Y 
A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. And have been working in that store for something like 
a year~ 
A. A year July 11th. 
Q. And you live in South Boston Y 
page 9 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you living and working in .South Boston 
at the A B 0 Store on January 23rd of this year~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Snead, I will tell you January 23rd is the night that 
Mr. Bennett received an accident there on Main Street in 
South Boston. I want to ask you if you saw Mr. Bennett 
shortly before he had that accident Y · 
. A. Yes, sir, I saw him, I will say-well, just in time for 
us to go down to the corner and come back and return and 
park. 
Q. Let us go back and approach it so we can get a little 
bit more from it. Tell where you were coming from, where 
you were going and where 1\.{r. Bennett was when you saw 
him. · 
A. We were going down the street, Booker and myself. 
Q. Mr. Dorsey Booker? 
A. Mr. Dorsey Booker. 
Q. Does he work in the A B C Store with you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You and he 'vere driving down Main Street in an auto-
mobile~ 
A. In an automobile. 
Q. Who was driving? 
A. Mr. Booker. Mr. Bennett was standing on the right 
side of the curb as 've went down. 
page 10 ~ Q. On the sidewalk? . 
A. On the sidewalk. We made aU turn at the 
Record-Advertiser corner (I don't know what the name of 
the street is) and came back and parked in front of the store 
and just as we came back to make an angle parking Mr. Ben-
nett and Mr. Fourquean were standing to the left of the. car 
as we came back to make the park. 
Q. If I understand you, you and 1\fr. Booker drove do·wn 
Main Street and when you drove down the street he was on 
the side,valk near the corner? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Near 'the Record-Advertiser corner? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. You turned around and came back up the street and 
when you came up the street you saw Mr. BeimettY 
A. Mr. Bennett and Mr. Fourquean were approximately in-
the middle of the street. 
Q. Near that intersection? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could y()u tell approximately, make an estimate, how 
far from the intersection Y 
A. Well, I would say approximately-! reckon it was 
around fifteen or twenty yards or something like that. 
Q. North .of the intersection Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 11 ~ Q. And he was about the middle of the street 
when you came downY 
A. I would say approximately the middle, yes. 
Q. I say about. You came back up and parked your car. 
Did you then hear anything of the accident Y 
A. As I stepped . out of the car I heard the noise and as I 
looked around I saw Mr. Bennett in the street and naturally 
I went-
Q. You did not see the actual accident 7 
A. I did not see the actual accident. 
Q. You just saw 11r. Benentt a short time before the acci-
dent? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not there were any cars 
parked on the west side of 1\fain Street in that block when you 
came down the street Y 
A. I could not recall. I could not tell you at all. 
Q. You did not notice Y 
A. No, I did not notice. 
Q. When you heard this impact did you run out into the 
street? 
A. I did not. Booker got out right behind me and he went 
down and I went in the store to call the doctor. 
Q. Did you later go down there? Do you know what car 
this was that collided-
page 12 ~ A. I could not tell you who was driving the 
car and I did not know until we· got back. 
Q. Did you go down to the pointY 
A. I did not go to the point. When I came out of the store · 
they were coming up to the car with Mr. B·ennett and I got 
in with them and went on to the hospital. 
Q. You didn't go down to examine the car? 
A. Not the actual place it happened, no. 
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·CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Settle: 
Q. After you and Mr. Booker had made the U turn at Bank 
Street and started back up Main Street on the right-hand side 
was Mr. Fourquean standing in approximately the center of 
the street as you passed and motioned you on Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Was Mr. Bennett to ~Ir. Fourquean 's right at that time 
and slightly to his rear? 
A. I couldn't tell you, ~Ir. Settle. I just noticed these 
two stap.ding there and I couldn't detect which was which at 
the time. 
Q. How close were those two men together, lVIr. Bennett and 
Mr. Fourquean. Y 
A. I would think they were about three or four feet. 
Q. Three or four feet apart Y 
page 13 ~ A. I should think so. 
Q. And you don't know which one was in front 
of the other? 
A. No, sir, I could not tell. 
Q. And you say as you passed them your recollection is 
that they were about fifteen or twenty yards from the inter-
section of Bank StreetY 
A. I would say approximately that. 
Q. Mr. Booker turned his car and parked at right angles 
in front of the A B C Store T 
A. Yes, sir. 
A. The A B C Store is on the east side of Main Street 
or on the right-hand side of ~fain Street facing north Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you heard the crash and looked and saw Mr. 
Bennett had been hit was the car which had hit him s\verving 
sharply to the left? · · 
A. I think when I looked around the car was to the left 
and I, of course, noticed 1\Ir. Bennett in the street and I 
couldn't tell whether the car had stopped moving altogether 
·or not. 
Q. Did J\Iiss Spencer turn her car to the left and drive 
over to the curb on the east side of the street on which you 
and 1\Ir. Booker parked your carY 
· · A. I couldn't tell you. I did not see the car 
page 14 ~ parked after the accident. When I came out of 
· the store I got right in the car with 1\Ir. Bennett 
and 1\{r. Noland and 1\fr. Booker and went straight to the 
hospital. I did not go to the scene of the accident. 
Q. Did you see her' car at all when she hit him Y 
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A. Not when it hit, no, sir. 
Q. Did you see her car after she had hit him and while 
it was moving or going in any direction? 
.A. I imagine it was her car because I saw the back of this 
car then. I did not know then whose car it was. 
Q·. Was that car swerving to the left or to the right of 
the street? 
A. It was to the left. 
Q. How far did this car go after h~tting J\.fr. Bennett? 
.A. I couldn't tell you, 1\fr. Settle. I don't have any idea. 
Q. It did not proceed down as far as the intersection, did 
it? 
A. I don't know at all: 
Q. When you came back out of the store after phoning 
to the hospital were the officers picking 1\fr. B·ennett up Y 
A. They had 1\{r. Bennett almost to ~Ir. Booker's c~r when 
I got back from the phone out of the store and they were 
practically ready to pull off, just getting ready to put him 
in. · · 
page 15 ~ DORSEY BOQI{ER, 
having been :first duly sworn, testified on behalf 
of the plaintiff as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. You are Mr. Dorsey Booker' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you live here in the town of Halifax and have 
all your life?. 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. You don't mind telling us how old you are? 
A. Thirty years old. 
Q. I belieYe you now work in the A B C Store in South 
Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you working there at that place in January of this 
year? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you working there the day that Mr. Bennett was 
hurt-had the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see 1\Ir. Bennett shortly before the accidentT 
A. I did. 
Q. I wish you would tell the Jury in your own way whether · 
you were driving or riding or walking when you saw him, w-ho 
"ras with you and where you were going and in what direction 
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and just the circumstances under which you saw 
page 16 ~ him and where he was when you saw him 1 
A. I was coming· down Main Street heading 
south. I was driving my car. Mr. Snead was with me and 
Mr. Bennett and Mr. Fourquean were on the sidewalk.· I 
made a turn, a left-hand turn, right below where they were 
standing and came on back up the street headed north and 
Mr. Fourquean a:nd 1\tir. Bennett ,,~ere, in the street, some-
where near the middle pf the street. I pulled in at the curb 
in front of the A B C Store and right after I stopped I heard 
a crash and I went back there and found out ~{r. Bennett 
had been hit. 
Q. If I understand you, you and ~Ir. Snead were driving 
down 1\tiain Street. Were you coming from supper, going 
back to work 7 
A. Coming from supper, going back to work around seven 
o'clock. 
Q. You were driving down Main Street south f 
A. South. 
Q. And you saw ~{r. Ben'nett on the sidewalk. Was that 
near the Record-Advertiser corner? 
A. Yes, somewhere near that. 
Q. And you turned and . came back up the street to park 
in front of the store and when yo~ came back up you say 1\tir. 
Bennett-did you see Mr. Bennett again? 
A. Yes, Mr. Bennett and 1\fr. F·ourquean. 
Q. Where were they when you saw them that 
page 17 ~ second time? 
A. They were in the street. 
Q. Locate them? I kno'v you didn't measure it but locate 
them as nearly as you can in the street? · 
A. They were somewhere near the middle of the street. 
· Q. The two of them 'vere in the street when you came back 
tipf 
A. Yes. 
·Q. You parked yonr car and heard this crash? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the crash a loud one, sir? 
A. I heard it, yes. 
Q. I want to ask you were the street lights burning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. Was the street well lighted 7 
A. Like it is usually lighted. 
Q. Did you have a'ny trouble as you drove down Main 
Street seeing objects t 
A. No, sir. 
J. G. Bennett, Admr., etc., v. Eliz. Spencer, et al. 39 
Q. Could you see objects a considerable distance ahead 
of you! 
A. Yes, sir, I didn't have any trouble. 
page 18 } CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Settle: 
"'Q. When you and Mr. Snead came back up the street in 
your car after you had made the U turn you were driving to 
the right of the center of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were M:r. Bennett and 1¥Ir. Fourquean standing side by 
side or was one of them three or four feet or more to the 
rear of the otheri 
A. I thought they were standing side by side. 
Q. Ho'v far apart were they standingY . 
A. I should say about a foot or two. 
Q. You say they were standing somewhere near the middle· 
of the street when you passed coming back Y 
A. Yes, sir.· 
Q. Which one of them was nearer to your carY 
·A. I think ~fr. Bennett was. 
Q. You think Mr. Bennett was nearer to your car than 
Fourquean was f ' 
A. Yes, sir. ·~· : 11 
Q. Did either one of them-I am speaking now as you 
came back up the street toward the A B C Store, after mak-
ing the U turn-
A. How is that f 
Q. After making the U turn did either one of 
page 19 } them motion you to pass on in your car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which one motioned you to pass Y 
A. I don't recall which one of them. I don't know which 
one it was. 
Q. And you say that you think ~fr. Bennett was nearer to 
your car than Mr. Fourquean? 
A. I think he was do,,rn the street a little closer to the cor-
ner when I made the turn than Mr. Fourquean was. 
Q. So you think Mr. Bennett was a little ahead of Mr. 
FourqueanY 
A. No, they were ·standing side by side but he was down 
the street and Mr. Fourquean, I think, was up above him. 
Q. But they were about the same distance from the east 
curb of the street f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't undertake to say definitely, do you, Mr. 
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Booker, whether or not Mr. Fourquean and Mr. Bennett were 
in exactly the middle of the street or over to the right of the 
center facing south, do you~ 
A. No, sir, I don't say they were exactly in the center. 
Q. You had no special reason in passing them to notice 
particularly j1:1st where they were standing? You didn't ex-
pect any accident or any trouble of any kind, did you Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 20 ~ Q. I believe you have stated you did not actually 
see the collision? 
A. No, sir, I did not see it. 
Q. As you drove your car into the curb on the east side of 
the street in front of the A B C Store do you recall whether 
or not there was another car approaching from an opposite 
direction or from the north and going south on Main Street f 
A. No, sir,. I didn't see any car. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. I neglected to ask you, Mr. Booker-Mr. Settle asked 
you if you saw another car about this time going down ~fain 
Street. Was there any car that passed abo.ut that time going 
in either direction? 
A. When I made the U turn down there to come back up 
Main Street there ·was a car down there about i'Il front of 
Harrell's place coming up Main Street north. I never did 
see that car any more, though. 
Q. Had that car passed on up the street at the time of 
this accident? · . 
A. I don't know what happened to it. 
Q. You never saw it any more? . 
A. I never saw it any more. 
page 21 ~ Q. Do you know whether there were any cars 
parked on the right-hand side, that is the west 
side of Main Street, in this block on which this accident hap-
pened? 
A. I don't recall. 
J. E. FOURQUEAN, 
having been first duly s'vorn, testified on behalf of the plain-
tiff as follows : · 
Examined by Mr. ~fartin : 
Q. You are ,J. E. Fourquean? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you on the police force in South Boston Y 
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.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. W·ere you on the police force in South Boston in Janu-
ary of this year? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you on the police force on January 23rd of this 
year, the day .on which Mr. ~ennett had his accident? 
A. Yes, sir, I was .workmg extra. 
Q. Night or day? 
A. Night. . 
Q. }fr. Bennett-was he on night or day duty? 
A. He was on day. 
Q. Mr. Bennett, I believe, was the Chief of Po-
page 22 ~ lice? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were a-
A. Patrolman. 
Q. Under Mr. Bennett 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What time are you supposed to come on duty? 
A. Seven o'clock. · 
Q. ·Do you. remember whether you came on duty that time 
that night? 
A. I was a little late. 
Q. When you came on duty that night did you see Mr. 
Bennett? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember where you met him Y 
A. I didn't meet him. I crossed the street. I-Ie was ..in 
front of the Liberty Cafe walking down the street. 
Q. That is. very near the Municipal Building in South Bos-
ton? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was he with anybody? 
A. ~{r. Noland. 
Q. That is ~{r. G. R. Noland? 
A. Yes, sir, Lieutenant Police. 
Q. He was also a patrolman at that time on night duty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 23 ~ Q. At that time you saw Mr. Bennett and Mr. 
Noland on the west side of Main Street near the 
Liberty Cafe? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You crossed the street over to them Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you cross over to them? 
A. I didn't cross over to them .. I crossed over to the Fire 
Station to put my lunch up. 
·"' 
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Q. Then did you go on and meet them? 
A. I caught up with them. 
Q. And 'vhat did you do then Y 
A. Walked with them down the street. 
Q. Tell me this: Was it customary for Mr. Bennett to give 
the night policemen-to see then1 when they ~me on duty 
and give them any instructions that he had to give them Y 
A. Yes,· sir. 
Q. Where was his custom of doing that Y 
A. Where was itY 
Q. Where, I say? 
A. Walking down the street. 
1\{r. McKinney: We object to that, what the custom 'vas. 
We think the evidence should be confined to what happened 
in this particular case. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. McKinney: We save the point. 
page 24 ~ By Mr. Martin: 
Q. If I understand you, you then joined Mr. 
Bennett and 1\{r. Noland and continued on down ~fain Streett 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you discussi•ng the duties of your respective po-
sitions? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Settle: We object to that question on the ground it is 
leading. · 
Mr. Martin: I asked then~ if they were discussing the du-
ties of their positions and he said "Yes", and it was ob-
jected to on the ground that it was leading. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. Settle: We except. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Go ahead, Mr. Fourquean, and describe the movements 
of you and Mr. Bennett and Mr. Noland from that time that 
the three. of you got together there about the Liberty Cafe. 
A. We were walking down the street talking about-I think 
the conversation was the street traffic light and first talking 
about one thing and another about the light and continued 
·on down the street. We was 'valking down the street in 
that same conversation and whe·n we got down about Waskey 
"Brothers Cleaning and Pressing, we have a telephone do'vn 
there, police telephone. 
page 25 ~ Q. Were you on the side of the street that Was-
key is onf 
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A. On the opposite side. This bell rang and Mr. Nol~nd 
went across the street to answer it. 
Q. You say that was the police telephone. 
A. Yes, and me and ~fr. Bennett stayed over on the right 
side of the street as we were going down and then we stepped 
into the street to cross over in kind of a bias angle and a car 
came down and turned in that intersection at Bank and Main 
streets and came back up the street and parked in-
Q. Was that the car in which ~fr. Snead and Mr. Booker 
were? 
A. I found later it was Mr. Snead. 
Q. When that car came up the street where were you and 
Mr. Bennett, when it turned and came up the street Y 
A. When it went down I expect we had stepped over in the 
street. I just can't recall but I expect we had stepped over 
in the street to cross after he had made his loop and we 
walked over in the street and we kind of stopped for that 
car to go around and come back up the street and when we 
started across, from 'what I can remember, a T model come 
up the street and went past me. I stopped. I was ov.er the 
other side of the middle of the street to the left and maybe 
I stepped one or two steps forward and I looked and said 
something or might have said something. Any-
page 26 ~ how, I looked back for Mr. B·ennett and I didn't 
see him, not by my side, and I turned and looked· 
over ID); right shoulder and I seen him standing out there 
near the middle of the street and I called-
Q. Wait a second. You say you had gone on ahead of Mr. 
Bennett? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you turned and sa'v ~fr. Bennett standing in the 
middle of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was his position? How was he facingY 
A. He was facing· down the street. 
Q. Toward the Southern depot Y 
A. Yes, with his hands up so (indicating) telling some-
thing about that intersection light, talking when I seen him 
Hnd when I looked right over my shoulder this car was prac-
tically up-
Q. How close was it to him? 
A. I don't know. I just seen the lights. It was coming 
at such a speed I just saw the lights and I wouldn't remem-
ber how close he was to him. I just seen the lights like that 
coming down and it hit him. 
Q. Did you make any effort to warn Mr. Bennett? 
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A. I called Mr. Bennett twice, just said "Mr. Bennett, 
Mr. Bennett", and he turned this way and when he turned 
that way the car hit him. 
page 27 ~ Q. Did you hear that car sound any horn 1 
- A. No; sir. 
Q. That car_ was going south, I understand? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Bennett had his back to the approaching carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What were you and ~{r. Bennett discussing at that time? 
A. ·That traffic light. · 
Q. There isn't any traffic light there? 
A. No, sir, but he was saying something-if the town had 
the lights he wished they 'vould put them in or something, 
what a benefit it would be. 
Q. Who was driving that car¥ 
A. Driving the car that hit Mr. Bennett Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. Miss Spencer. · 
Q. 1Yiiss Elizabeth Spencer' 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe she is _the daughter of Mr. Thomas M. Spen .. 
cer? 
A. "What we call "Doc" Spencer. 
· Q. Do you know whether that car turned just b,efore or 
just about the time that it hit Mr. Bennett? Did it turn to 
either the right or the left T 
page 28 ~ A. I don't think it made any turn at all until 
· after it struck him . 
. Q. And then which way did it turn Y 
A. It turned to the left toward the curb. 
Q. "Where did i~ stop? 
A. It stopped near the intersection of the street over on 
the left-hand side. 
Q. Sir? 
A. It stopped near the intersection of the street over on 
the left-hand side. 
Q. Did it stop in the intersection or north or south of it Y 
A. North. 
Q. It stopped before-
A. It stopped before it g-ot to the intersection. 
Q. It stopped up against the curb on the east side Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Do you know wha.t part of the car hit Mr. Bennett Y 
A. It was the right light. 
Q. Was that light broken Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Did you later pick up the glass from that light Y 
A. Sir? 
Q. Do you know whether the glass was knocked out of that 
light? 
A. I seen it on the street. I didn't examine the 
page 29 ~ car. · 
Q. Were the street lights burning at that timeY 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe the map shows that there are stores on both 
sides of the street all along there. Were there any lights in 
any considerable number of those stores 7 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the weather? 
A.. The weather was kind of rainy. 
Q. Was it raining ·hard 7 
A.. No, sir. 
Q. .A drizzle T 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you have any diffculty there or could you see ob-
jects there that night in this street? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A considerable distance away? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you form any estimate as to how fast this car 
of :M:iss Spencer's was going? 
A. Well, it was going about thirty or thirty-five miles an 
hour. 
Q. You 'viii say about thirty-five miles an hour¥ 
A. Thirty or thirty-five miles an hour. 
Q. I believe I asked you the question if you heard the 
horn sound of that automobile and you said you did 
page 30 ~ not? . ' 
·A. No, sir. . \ · 
Q. Did you ask Miss Spencer or did she make any state-
ment to you with reference to whether or not she saw Mr. 
Bennett? -
A. I don't think she did. 
Q. She did not to you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did she make any statement to you that night with 
reference to the speed a.t which she was riding? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. After this accident what did you do, Mr. FourqureanY 
A. After the accident? 
_ Q. Yes. 
A. I called Mr. Noland. I just-
Q. Then you and Mr. Noland took Mr. Bennett upY 
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A. We took him up. 
Q. And carried. him to the hospital T . 
A. Mr. Noland went with him. 
Q. I believe he -died a few days later T 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Settle: 
Q. You say that when you came on duty on the night of 
the accident you crossed over the street to the west 
page 31 ~ side of Main Street to the Fire Station to put your 
lunch down~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the time you crossed the street for this purpose you 
saw Mr. Bennett and 1\!Ir. Noland walking together down the 
west side of }./fain StreetT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After putting down your lunch you followed them and 
overtook them at the Liberty Cafe Y 
A. About at the Liberty Cafe. 
Q. Is the Liberty Cafe about one hundred and fifty yards 
or one hundred and twenty-five yards from where this acci-
dent took placeT 
A. I don't know, sir. 
Q. You have be·en a policeman in South Boston a good 
while, haven't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can't you estimate how far it is from the Liberty Cafe 
down to where J\tir. Bennett 'vas hit by Miss Spencer's car? 
A. I am just a poor judge on estimating distance. 
Q. It is more than two blocks, isn't it, from the Liberty 
Cafe to where this collision occurred T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The Liberty Cafe is only three doors from the Fire 
Station in the Municipal Building in South Boston, isn't it Y 
A. It is. 
page 32 t Q. And on the west side of the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Bennett had gotten off duty and was on his way 
home, wasn't he 7 
A. He was on his way home, yes, sir. 
Q. He and J\tir. Noland were just walking slowly along 'vhen 
you caught up with them? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say that you and Mr. Noland and Mr. Bennett 
were just talking in general about traffic lights T · 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Is that all you were talking about 7 
A. We _were discussing traffi·c lights on the way down. 
Q. Would you mind getting your hand away from your 
1nouth and speak out distinctly, Mr. Fourquean, so the Jury 
and we can hear you. They have no traffic lights in South 
Roston, have they? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where were you and Mr. Bennett and Mr. Noland when 
the police bell began ringing over on the other side of the 
street in the building next to Waskey Brothers? 
A. We was about opposite the building. 
Q. You say Mr. Noland left you and Mr. Bennett and 
crossed over to the opposite side of the street to answer 
that call? 
page 33 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You and J\IIr. Bennett were still discussing 
what when :&Ir. Noland left you 7 
A. Those traffic lights. 
Q. Well, what was·there about the traffic lights which would 
cause you to discuss it from the Liberty Cafe on down the 
street two and one-half blocks or more away before the col-
1ision? 
A. Well, he 'vas telling-he was doing most of the talking 
all the way down th~ street about what benefit it would be 
for the town and what the lights was in some other city he 
had been in. He said something about High Point or some 
North Carolina town he was talking about. 
· Q. It 'vasn 't necessary for him to get out into the street 
to discuss the traffic lights with you? 
A. lie was out talking about them and had his hands up 
in that manner (indicating). 
Q. So you and :&Ir. Bennett, after Mr. Noland had left you, 
stepped out in the street and started across it at an angle Y 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. Were you going at an angle over to the east side of 
the street in a southerly direction or were you to turn back 
up and go in a northerly direction T 
A. In a southerly direction. 
page 34 }- Q. That was the way Mr. Bennett usually went 
home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he was on his way home on this occasion 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. He had on his policeman's uniform 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And a dark blue coat? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. How far was Mr. Bennett from the curb of the street 
on the west side when he was hit by Miss Spencer's car 7 
A. How far from the intersection? 
Q. No, not how far from the intersection . 
. -. A. How far over in the street Y 
Q. How far from the curb? 
A. Well, I would say eighteen feet. . 
Q. As you went across the street how far were you ahead 
of Mr. Bennett or behind him ,vhen the car hit him? 
A. Well, I was over nearly across the street. I had nearly 
got across. 
Q. Yon had nearly gotten across the street to the east side 
of Main Street? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say Mr. Bennett was about eighteen feet from 
the curb on the west side? 
page 35 ~ A. I would say something like that. 
Q. How far were you and Mr. Bennett apart 
when Mr. Booker passed you all in his car after making the 
U turn at Bank Street and coming back up the street? 
A. I will say we were standing beside one another. I say 
we would be standing beside one another when he come down 
the street and made the U tum. 
Q. Now I am asking you how far apart you and Mr. Ben-
nett were after he had made the U turn and came· back up the 
street? 
A. I don't remember. I didn't miss Mr. Bennett until I 
had got across the street. · 
Q. So then you 'vere considerably in front of J\!Ir. Bennett? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You were standing on the driver's side of Mr. Booker's 
car or nearer Mr. Booker's car than Mr. Bennett was; is that 
correct? 
A. The car Mr. Snead was in? 
Q. Yes. ' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did either you or Mr. Bennett wave Mr. Booker's car 
on by as that passed Y 
A. I don't remember. I wouldn't say that we did. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Your answer was you didn't recall? 
A. Yes, I didn't recall. · 
page 36 r By :1\fr. Settle : 
Q. So you were a right considerable distance 
ahead of Mr. Bennett wh~n Mr. Booker's car passed Y 
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A. Yes, sir, I reckon so. 
Q. You have testified something about a. T model Ford 
having come up the street from the direction of the .Southern 
Railway on this same occasion. Did that car come· up the 
street in ·front of or behind Mr. Booker's car? 
A. It seemed to be behind his car. 
Q. How far behind it? · 
A. I don't know. It wasn't so far behind his car as I re-
member~ Maybe after he pulled into the curb and parked it 
passed by. . - . · 
Q. So now you distinctly remember that car passing, do 
you? 
A. I think so. 
Q. So then Miss Spencer was meeting this T model Ford 
at the time or about the time of the collision? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you testified that you didn't see Miss Spen-
cer's car until the lights flashed just about the time of the 
collision; is that right? · · 
A. Yes, sir, as I looked around to see where Mr. Bennett 
was over my right shoulder I seen the lights right on him~ 
Q. As you turned around and looked over your right shoul-
der you saw her for the first time and it was then 
page 37 ~ that her car hit Mr. Bennett? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. Then, :hfr. Fourquean, how were you able, under such 
circumstances, with so limited an observation-ho'v were you 
able, under such circumstances, to estimate the rate of speed· 
at which Miss Spenyer was going? 
A. Well, I just couldn't estimate the exact facts of it but 
it was coming at a fast speed. 
Q. It 'vas misting at the time Y 
A. Yes. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By. Mr. ]\far tin : 
Q. Mr. Fourqurean, do you recall whether or not there 
were any cars parked on the west side of Main Street in 
that block between Arch and Bank Streets as you walked down 
the street? -
A. I noticed there 'vasn 't any parked from the warehouse, 
one door from Arch Street, down to Bank Street. 
Q. They 'vere not parked? · 
A. From the warehouse. I don't recall whether there were 
any parked by Patterson's drug store or not. 
Q. You mean from the Star warehouse driveway? 
SO Supreme <Jourt of Ap~als of Virginia .. 
A. Yes. 
page 38 ~ Q. There were no cars parked between the Star 
warehouse drive,vay and the intersection of Bank 
StreetY· 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Whether there were any cars parked north of that I 
understand you to say you didn't notice f 
A. I didn't notice that. 
DR. I. IC. BRIGGS, 
having been first duly sworn, testified on behalf of the plain-
tiff as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. You are Dr. I. K. Briggs 1 
A. I am. 
Q. You are a practicing physician in South Boston f 
A. I am. 
Q. You have practiced the.re for a number of years! 
A. Thirty. 
Q. You are duly licensed and qualified under the Laws of 
Virginia Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you practicing in South Boston in January of 
this year! 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you are one of the proprietors of 
page 39 ~ the Halcyon Hospital Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you know Mr. W. R. Bennett, the Chief of ·Police 
of South Boston f 
A. Very well. 
Q. Was Mr. Bennett brought to the Halcyon Hospital on 
the night or early in the night of January 23rd of 1935 t 
A. Yes. 
Q. Suffering from injuries f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you examine him Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wbat was the nature of his injuries f 
A. He had five ribs broken on the left side about an inch 
from the spine, severe shock and probably some internal 
hemorrhage. 
Q. Are the ribs at that point strong? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does it talre a heavy or a light blow to fracture ribs 
at that pointY . 
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A. It took a right heavy blow to break them the way his 
were broken and the number that were broken. 
Q. I understood there were five broken on which side Y 
A. Left side. 
page 40 ~ Q. About an inch from the spine Y 
A. Yes. · 
Q. Were those injuries severe T 
A. Fatal. 
Q. I take it from that answer that he died as a result 
of those injuries Y • 
A. He did. 
Q. How long after the· injuries were received Y 
A. I think he died on the 29th, about five days, I think. 
I think it was the 29th of January. 
Q. About how long was that after the accident Y 
A. The accident 'vas about seven-thirty on the 23rd. 
Q. What time did he die 7, 
A. In the afternoon. 
Q. In the afternoon of the 29th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you known J\Ir. Bennett long? 
A. Yes. 
Q. IIow long? 
A. Ever since I have been here. 
Q. Ever since you had been in the count37Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you his family physician? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever had occasion to practice on Mr. Bennett 
or to treat him Y 
page 41 } A. Very little. 
Q. What was his condition! Did you see him 
often Y 
A. I saw him a·aily, yes. 
Q. What was the condition of his healthY 
Mr. Settle: We object to that. 
The Court: On what ground? 
Mr. Settle: On the ground that he hasn't laid the proper 
foundation for such a question or such an examination. It 
is not for us to indicate, of course, what foundation he should 
lay but we earnestly insist he has not laid the proper foun-
dation for that question. 
The Court : Overruled. 
J\1:r. Settle: We except on the ground that the question 
is improper. 
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By Mr. Martin: 
Q. What was the condition of his health' 
A. I hadn't attended him but very little. 
Q. Judging from what you had seen of him and from his 
general ,appearance. 
Mr. Settle: We object. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. Settle: We except. 
A .. I made no examination of him physically but he was 
. seldom sick. That is all-enough to call me for 
page 42 ~ anything. 
By the Court : 
Q. Do you lmow how old a man Mr. Bennett was Y 
A. I have forgotten right now, I· couldn't tell you right 
now his age. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Settle: 
Q. Was Mr. Bennett suffedng from high blood pressure, 
Doctor? 
A. I hadn't examined him for it. I don't know. 
· Q. And I believe you have testified that you had never 
made a physical examination of him before this accident Y 
A. I had seen him for some little things, sicknesses, since 
!have known him but I hadn't examined him for some time. 
Q. Doctor, a day or so before Mr. Bennett's death he 
appeared to be improving, didn't heY 
A. There never was any real improvement in him. 
Q. Did he develop pneumonia Y 
A. He had edema of the lungs the day· he died, tha.t is not 
a true pneumonia. When the circulation failed his lungB 
filled up. 
Q. In what way did this injury cause his death Y 
A. It injured the spinal nerves for one thing and caused 
· a paralysis of his intestines and practically all of 
page 43 ~ his functions and affected. his heart and he may 
· have had an internal hemorrhage somewhere in-
side. 
Q. How long before his death was it before his intestines 
were paralyzed? 
1 A. It came on gradually and got worse and worse. 
Q. And what did you say about his developing pneumonia 
before his death! 
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A. I said he had an adema of the lungs which is a fluid 
that fills up the lungs just before death when the circulation 
fails and his heart went bad and the circulation fails. 
Q. Does that usually happen 'vhen pneumonia develops 7 
A. That is not pneumonia. It is an entirely different 
thing. 
G. R. NOLEN, 
having been first duly sworn, testified on behalf of the plain-
tiff as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. You are Mr. G. R. Nolen? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are a police officer of South Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you a police officer of South Boston in 
page 44 t January of this year Y 
A.- Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you on duty at the time Mr. Bennett had this 
accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been a police officer. of South Bos-
ton? 
A. About eight years. 
Q. How long had you known Mr. Bennett?" 
A. I had known Mr. Bennett since 1919. 
Q. Since about 1919? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Bennett, I believe, 'vas Chief of Police of South 
Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He was your superior officer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Bennett on the evening or night on 
which he received this accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the Jury where you saw him and about what time 
you met up 'vith him? 
A. About seven o'clock or just after seven. 
Q. Talk a little louder. Were you on night duty at that 
time? 
page 45 r A. Yes, sir. 
Q. J\IIr. Bennett was on day duty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I understand you met up with him about seven 
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o'clock or maybe shortly afterwards. Whereabouts did you 
meet up with him? 
A. I was there some little time before seven o'clock and we 
\Valk€d on down th€ street. Mr. Fourquea.n overtaken us-
I don't rememoor just where. 
Q. Mr. Fourquean, you say, overtook you? 
A. Yes, and all three of us walked down the street to-
gether. That was what we usually done. 
Q. You say that it what you usually did Y 
A. Yes. 
A. Discussing what had happened during the day and \Vhat 
he expected us to do during the night. 
Q. Do you remember what you were discussing this par-
ticular evening as you 'vere walking down the street Y 
A. Y·es, 've 'vere discussing traffic lights. 
Q. Proceed on down the street, Mr. Noland, and tell us of 
your movements, yours and Mr. Fourquean's and Mr. Ben-
nett's as nearly as you recall them 1 
A. When we got down near the intersection of Bank Street 
the police bell rang and I left them on the side-
page 46 ~ walk. 
Q. Let me interrupt you one second. Is there 
a police bell or a police telephone over on the east side of 
Main Street? 
A. Yes, there are three telephones connected with the police 
telephone. One. of them is at Mr. Waskey's place there and 
when one ooll rings all of them ring. I stepped across the 
street and left them standing on the sidewalk and I stepped 
across the street to answer the telephone and there was a 
long distance call and just as I started talking I heard a 
c;rash. 
Q. Just as you started talking over the telephone T 
A. I heard a crash. 
Q. Did you see the accident? 
A. No, sir. From the sound of the crash I thought it was 
an automobile accident or automobiles had run together and 
Mr. Fonrquean hollered and when he hollered I dropped 
the receiver and ran out on the street and ~Ir. Bennett was 
down in the street and Mr. Fourquean had hold of him. 
Q. Was Mr. Bennett when you went over there lower down 
the street or higher up the street from the point that you 
had stopped and crossed over? 
. A. He was some little distance down the street, laying 
about the center of the street. 
Q. Did you see the car that struck him Y 
A. 1res, sir. · 
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page 47 ~ Q. Who was driving that car7 
A. I learned later that Miss Spencer was driv-
ing. I didn't know at the time. 
Q. Did you later have a little conversation with Miss Spen-
\!er that evening? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And she was driving the carY 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Miss Elizabeth Spencer is the daughter of Mr. Thomas 
P. Spencer, I believe? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Settle: Thomas M. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. And I understood you to say that Mr. Bennett was 
lying about the middle of Main Street some distance down 
the street from where you had stopped to cross over f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was this car that struck him? 
A. The car had swerved into the left curb. 
Q. Did you examine the car? 
A. No, sir, not at that time. 
Q. Did you later examine it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long afterwards? 
A. Just a short time afterwards, after I got back 
page 48 ~ from the hospital. 
Q. Sir? 
A. Just a short time after I got back from the hospital. 
Q. When you came back from the hospital the car was 
still there f 
A. No, sir, the car wasn't there. Mr. Spencer came back 
down there. · 
Q. Mr. Thomas Spencer, and did you go with him and 
examine the carY 
A. He had the car. 
Q. Was any part of the car broken f 
A. The right headlight glass was broken out. 
Q. Did you pick up that glass or see it in the street f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What part of the street? 
A. It was near the center of the street. 
Q. Did Miss Elizabeth Spencer make any statement t& you 
that night with reference to the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Did she make any. statement as to whether or not she 
saw Mr. Bennett Y 
A. She said she did not see him. 
Q. Did you· hear the horn of her car sound just before the 
accident or any time before the accident Y 
page 49 r A. No, sir, not as I recall. 
. Q. Did Miss Spencer make any statement to you 
as to the· speed of her car 1 
· A. She said she thought she 'vas going between twenty 
and thirty miles. 
Q. Did you see the car yourself so as to be able to form 
any estimate of its speed! 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. Did you examine the street there to see whether there 
were any marks of the wheels of her car dragging or skidding 
or any other sign tha.t her brakes had been appHed before 
this collision Y 
A. Yes, sir, I went back do'vn there afterwards. 
Q. Were there any signs to indicate itt 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you remember whether the street lights were burn-
ing at that timeT 
A. Yes, sir, they were burning just as usual. 
Q. Were there any lights in any of the stores on both sides 
of the street there T 
A. There wasn't any on the west side. There was a light 
shining from the front of the A B C store. 
Q. What was the wea.therY · 
A. The weather was cold and cloudy and kind of drizzling 
rain. 
page 50 r Q. Did the street light and the other lights there 
at that time make it possible to see objects in the 
street at any considerable distance 7 
A. Yes, just as usual, just like they had been and just like 
they are now. 
Q. Were tl1e lights such that you could have seen an object 
in the street there :fifty or one hundred feet away! · 
A. Yes, sir, I think so. 
Q. More than that, would you sayY 
A. I would think so. 
Q. Do you remember whether or not there were any cars 
parked on the west side of Main Street in this block in which 
this accident happened Y 
, A." There wasn't any anywhere near where the accident 
happened or where I went across the street to answer the 
telephone there weren't any cars there. 
Q. Was there much traffic on the street at that time~ 
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A. No, sir, not very much-some. It was just about as 
usual for that time of day. There wasn't very much traffic. 
Q. That was at supper time 7 
A. At supper time. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Settle: 
Q. Mr. Nolen, did you see Mr. Booker and Mr. Snead come 
up the street on the right-hand side facing north, 
page 51 ~ come up Main Street on the right-hand side facing 
north, and stop along there in front of the A B C 
storeY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see aT model Ford come up along about that 
time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. IIow wide is Main Street there where this accident oc-
curred? 
A. Forty-four feet. 
- Q. Is that the distanc~ from curb to curb 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. White parking lines have been laid off there on that 
street? 
A. Yes, sir, parallel on the right side, on the west side, 
and hea.d.:.in lines on the east side. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. You said parallel on the west side and head-in on the 
east side? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Settle : 
Q. How far from the curb is the outer edge of this white 
parking line? 
A. Six feet six inches. 
Q. You made these measuren1ents yesterday at my re-
quest? 
page 52 r A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say, Mr. Noland, that the weather was 
cold and cloudy and kind of a drizzling rain 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is the street where this accident occurred a black 
asphalt street? · 
A. Yes,/sir. . 
Q. When the street is wet and it is misting rain isn't it 
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much harder to see an object in the street when the lights 
are shining on the wet street at night Y 
A. Yes, I would say it would be some harder because 
asphalt 'vhen it is rained on shows up black. 
Q. When you came back from answering the phone call 
right after the accident I believe you stated that Miss Spen-
cer's car was parked over to her left on the east side of the 
street? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Was her car headed in a southeasterly direction at 
about a forty-five degree angle or something like that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That car was some distance from the intersection at 
Bank StreetY 
A. No, sir, right at the intersection. 
Q. How far is the place where you received this telephone 
call to the intersection at Bank StreetY 
A. I couldn't tell you. I would have to g·ive you 
page 53 ~ an estimate of it. 
Q. Is that phone located in a part of the old 
P. & M. bank building Y , 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That building is now occupied by Waskey Brothers, I 
believe? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You testified you didn't see the accident at all? 
A. No, sir, I didn't see it. 
Q. And when you got back there Mr. Fourquean was getting 
Mr. Bennett over toward the carY 
A. No, he had hold of him. Mr. Bennett was still laying 
in the street when I got there. I helped pick him up. 
Q. Mr. Bennett was wearing his uniform that night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He had on his dark blue uniform overcoat T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And regular policeman's cap? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. His cap and pistol, I believe, were knocked-
A. They were left there on the street, yes. 
Q. Were you supposed to go on duty at seven o'clock? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Mr. Bennett was s_upposed to, go off duty at seven Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 54~ Q. And he was on his way home when this col-
lision qccurred Y 
A. Yes. 
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Q. The way he was traveling that night was the way he 
usually went home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A'Ir. Noland, how far is it, as best you can estimate it, 
from the Liberty Cafe down to where this accident occurred Y 
A. I estimate it would be around three hundred and fifty 
yards, a little over three blocks. 
Q. The Liberty Cafe, I believe, is located about three doors 
from the Fire Station in the :Afunicipal Building on Main 
Street in South Boston 7 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the Liberty Cafe is on the west side of Main StreetY 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you estimate that the point of collision was about 
three hundred and :fifty yards south of the Liberty Cafe Y 
A. That is my estimation. Of course, that is a rough esti-
mate. 
page 55} RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. You have been ·on the police force with Mr. Bennett 
for a number of years 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was Mr. Bennett kept away from the discharge of his 
duties much of the time by ill health T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Go ahead. I didn't mean to interpret you? 
A. He lost less time from work than any man I knew of. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Settle: 
Q. How old was Mr. Bennett 7 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You never heard him say? 
A. He was between sixty and seventy, I think, but I don't 
know his exact age. 
page 56} R. 0. HARRELL, 
having been first duly sworn, testified on behalf of 
the plaintiff as follows: 
Q. Mr. Harrell, I believe you are Mayor of the toWn. of 
South Boston? · · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Yon have lived in South Boston all your life f 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know Mr. W. R. BennettY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known him~ 
A. For the past twenty years or more. 
Q. Practically ever since you have been a manY 
A. Yes. ' 
Q. You have been Mayor of the town, I believe, for some-
thing like two years 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As Mayor of the town did you have general supervision 
"Jf the police force of the townY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe Mr. W. R. Bennett 'vas Chief of Police? 
A. Yes. 
· Q. Will you give us some idea-had he been Chief of Police 
for a number of years7 
A. Quite a: number of years. 
Q. And as a member of the force for some years 
page 57 } before he was ChiefY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know what salary he was getting at the time 
of his death or approximately the salary? · 
A. The salaries had been changed so much that I wouldn't 
say positive but I think it was around one hundred dollars 
a month. 
Q. Since the depression days the salaries had been reduced 
but your recollection is at the time it was $1007 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want to know did Mr. Bennett miss much time from 
workT 
A. Very, very seldom from any cause. 
Q. Did you ever know of his having any sickness Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I want to know in what regard the officials of the town 
of South Boston held him Y 
A. They held him in the very highest regard as an officer 
and as a man. 
Mr. McKinney: Of course, Your Honor, we object to that. 
It has nothing to do with it. 
The Court: I overrule the objection. 
Mr. Settle : We except. 
page 58 r By the· Court: 
Q. Do you know how old Mr. Bennett was? 
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Mr. Martin: I am going to offer the evidence on that. If 
there is any objection to that we don't mind it being ruled 
out. 
Mr. Settle : It is in now. 
The Court: Let it go. Let the record show that the objec-
tion was offered after the question was asked and answered. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. McKinney: 
Q. You are not certain about what Mr. Bennett's salary 
was at the time of his death Y 
A. No, sir. I know he did get $140 before the cuts started. 
Q. Wasn't it $90 at the time of the accident? 
A. It was around that. The regular patrolmen were get-
ting $75 and I think ~Ir. Bennett was either ninety or one 
l1undred or one hundred and ten. I couldn't say e·xactly. 
Q. Mr. Harrell, you, of course, are familiar with that situ-
ation down tl1ere 'vhere this accident happened. At that time 
were the buildings lighted or occupied on the right-hand 
side immediately north-I mean on the west side of Main 
Street immediately north of the intersection with Bank 
Street? The first building is occupied by the News 
page 59 ~ Printing or Record-Advertiser Printing Company 
and the next one wa.s vacant, was it not? 
A. I think so,. yes. 
Q. And next above that the old warehouse property was 
vacant, and those other places along there were not lighted 
at tha.t time, were they, so as to light the street? 
A. Mr. McKinney, I couldn't say about that. 
Q. The place next to the News Office was vacant Y 
A. It was vacant. I am positive of that. 
Q. Not occupied by anybody. There are no brightly lighted 
.stores or anything on that side along there, are there, at 
night? 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: . 
Q. Mr. Harrell (this is new matter they brought in; I didn't 
ask this) at that point and aU up and down the street the 
town has city lights, hasn't it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they adequately light the streets of the townY . 
A. We have had to cut out some of the lights on the .streets 
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and just how they are dodged at that particular point I am 
just not able to say. 
Q. You didn't cut out any lights that you felt 
page 60 ~ were necessary, did you 7 
A. No, sir, we did not. 
Q. I also understood you to say that at one time Mr. Ben-
nett's salary, you thought, 'vas $140? 
A. That was before any cuts, yes, a couple of years ago. 
Q. Was he cut down to the salary he was drawing be-
cause he· wasn't faithful in the discharge of his duties or be-
cause of the depression Y 
A. Because of the depression. They were all cut equally, 
the same percentage. 
G. R. NOLAND, 
recalled by the plaintiff, further testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. Mr. Noland, I understood that you said yon picked up 
this glass from the headlight of Miss Spencer's car and you 
also helped pick up ~1:r. Bennett himself after the accident! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I want to know, as near as you can tell us, how far 
was the point at which you picked up Mr. Bennett's body to 
the point where you picked up that glass from the headlight! 
A. About twenty feet. 
Q. Was the body south or north of the place 
page 61 ~ 'vhere you picked up the glass? 
A. South. 
CROS.S EXAMINAT.ION. 
By Mr. Settle : 
Q. Mr. Noland, Mr. Harrell has testified that all the police 
officers were reduced in salary the same amount during the 
depression. What was your salary at the time this occurred Y 
A. $75 a month. · 
Q. What was Mr. Bennett's salary! 
A. $90 a month. · 
J. GORDON BENNETT, 
the plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. I believe you are a son of Mr. W. R. BennettY 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And you are the duly qualified administratbr of his 
estate? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you ar-e the J. Gordon Bennett who is the plaintiff 
in this suit 7 · 
page 62 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I want to know what family your father leftY 
A. He left a wife and three boys and three girls. 
Q. How old was your father? 
A. My father was sixty-two years old. 
Q. Sixty-two years old at the time of his death Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And his wife is your mother? 
A. My mother was fifty-eight, I think. I have a record 
of the ages here if I may refer to it. 
Q. Her age, you say, is fifty-eightY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Give the ages of the children, the names and ages Y 
A. Ruby Mizell was 24, William Weldon was 20 and Charle.s 
Norman was 28, Ruth was 31 (her name is Alice Ruth), Lillian 
Louise was 23 and I am 33. 
By the Court: 
Q. Are the daughters married? 
A. One of them is. 
Q. Which one is? 
A. Ruth. 
By -Mr. Martin: 
Q. The youngest son, I believe, is 20 f 
A. Yes. 
page 63 ~ Q. Has he completed his education f 
A. No, sir, he is still in high school. 
Q. In the high school in South Boston Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how much time he has got Y 
A. He is expected to finish in February of next term pro~ 
vided he makes his studies. 
Q. That son lived at home with your mother and fatherY 
A. Yes, as did two other daughters. 
Q. Two other daughters did too 1 
A. Two youngest daughters. 
Q. They were not married 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know how long your father had been connected 
with the police force of South Boston T 
A. If I remember correctly, he had been with the town de-
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partment between twenty and twep.ty-two or twenty-three 
years. 
Q. He had been there from twenty to twenty-two years 
prior to his death Y 
A. He joined the police force when I was a comparative 
youngster. · 
Q. Was your mother dependent on your father for her 
support! 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 64 ~ Q. Was the son you refer to dependent on him Y 
A. Practically, yes, sir. 
Q• Do you know whether the daughters that lived at home 
were wholly or partially dependent on him for support Y 
A. They had a' very moderate income, part time job. I 
think one of them was making approximately twenty to 
twenty-six dollars a month and the other one about thirty-
five. 
Q. I understood that Miss Spencer turned her car to the 
was your mother, your youngest brother and these two daugh-
ters! 
A. That is right. 
(No cross examination.) 
Mr. Martin: We rest. We want to ask Mr. Bennett an-
other question. 
J. GORDON"BENNETT, 
the plaintiff, was recalled and further testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. Mr. Bennett, was your father a kind and affectionate 
father to his children and a kind and affectionate husband to 
his wife? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 65 ~ Mr. Settle: We. object to that. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. What was the feeling that his children and his wife 
had for himf 
A. I wouldn't say it because it is my mother and father 
but I don't believe I ever saw a more devoted couple and we 
children enjoyed a companionship with our father that I 
believe very few children did enjoy. He entered into our 
problems and our plays from childhood right on up to the 
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time of his death. He was interested in everything we un-
dertook or attempted to do. 
Q. Prior to the death of your father was your home, the 
home in South Boston, a happy home 1 
A. Yes. 
page 65A ~ The foregoing testimony does not show in what 
manner the witnesses indicated that the plain-
tiff's intestate was standing at the time he was struck by 
the automobile driven by the defendant Elizabeth Spencer, 
and a.t the request of counsel for the plaintiff the Court mad() 
the following statement for the record: "Bennett was stand-
ing facing south with his hands and arms extended in front 
of him upward and forward.'' 
BE IT REME1IBERED that the defendants, to maintain 
the issue on their part, introduced the following evidence: 
Mr. McKinney: I understood that counsel agreed to stipu-
late that the town of South Boston is an incorporated town 
of approximately 5,000 inhabitants and that the accident in 
question happened on the principal business street of the 
town. 
Mr. ~{artin: Yes. 
page 66 ~ SARAH NICHOLS, 
having been first duly sworn, testified on behalf 
of the defendants as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Settle: 
Q. You are Miss Sarah Nichols? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live Y 
A. South Boston. 
Q. Have you lived there all of your life? 
A. Yes, sir. : 
Q. And 'vhat is your age? 
A. I am eighteen. 
Q. Were you in a car with Miss Elizabeth Spencer on the 
night ,of January.· 23rd, 1935, when she had a collision in 
which ~fr. W. R. Bennett was injured? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What time of night did the accident occur? 
A. Seven ten. 
Q. Where did you get in the car with Miss Spencer? 
A. In front of my house. 
Q. Did she come by your house after you Y 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you previously phoned her to come by after you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you live with your father on Jeffrey Street 
in South Boston near the Halcyon I-Iospital Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 67 ~ Q. 1\tiiss Elizabeth was drivmg the car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After she came by. and picked you up in the car where 
did she goY 
A. She ·went around by F·ernston Street and up Broad and 
turned up and went down Main Street by the Post Office. 
Q. She came out by the Post Office and turned down Main 
Street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe Miss Spencer's home is on Peach Avenue of 
South Boston which is some distance north of the Post Office; 
is that right Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So when she turned down ~fain Street she was not going 
in the direction of her home but opposite therefrom? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was she going 1 
· A. She was going down to the Southern Railway Station 
and turn around and come back and go home. 
Q. Tell us as best you can from your best recollection just 
how the accident occurred and where it occurred? 
A. Well, it 'vas, I reckon, about :fifty feet from the inter-
. section of Bank .Street and I ·happened to see Mr. Bennett 
V and I hollered ''Watch", and 've were about eight feet from 
him then and she applied the brakes. 
page 68 ~ Q. She applied her brakes? 
A. Yes, and she turned to the left. 
Q. Turned her car to the left 1 
A. Swerved her car to the left. 
Q. And how far do you say Mr. Bennett was ahead of her 
when you cried out "Watch"f 
A. About eight feet. 
Q. Where was Mr. Bennett standing in the street then f 
A. He was standing about fifteen feet from the curbing. 
Q. On the-
A. On the right side. 
Q. On the right side. Is that the west side of Main Street f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was his position in the street? Was he facing 
her or turned away from her? 
A. His back was to her. 
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Q. Did she apply her brakes as soon as you cried out 
"Watch"? 
A. 1Ces, sir. · 
Q. And you say she swerved her car to the left? 
A. 1Ces, sir. 
Q. How far did her car go after she applied her brakes and 
struck Mr. Bennett? 
A. She stopped just like that. I don't know 
page.69} exactly how far it went-about the length of the 
/ car, I imagine. 
y Q. About a length of the car, you imagine? 
A. 1C es, sir. , 
Q. Did she stop her {iar then? · 
A. 1Ces, sir. 
Q. Did either of you get out or did anybody go there to 
where he was 7 
A. We turned and parked on the other side of the street 
and both got out. 
Q. She parked her car over-
A. On the east side of the street. 
Q. Was it parked parallel or diagonally across the street 
at an angle? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. So your testimony is, as I understand it, that she went 
only a few feet after applying her brakes when she struck 
him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far do you say Mr. Bennett was from the inter-
section of Bank Street? 
A. Fifty feet, approximately fifty feet. 
Q. Ho'v fast was Miss Spencer driving at that time, as 
best you can tell? 
A. About twenty miles an hour. 
Q. That is an estimate on your part? 
page 70 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you impressed at the time with the 
fact that she was, in your opinion, driving at a slow rate of 
speed? · 
Mr. 1\{artin: We object to that. 
The Court : Sustained. 
By Mr. Settle: 
Q. What part of her car struck Mr. B·ennett? 
A. The right bumper and the right headlight. 
Q .. When she struck Mr. Bennett and swerved her car to 
the left did it throw 1\fr. Bennett toward the center of the 
street or more toward his right? 
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A. Well, it threw him toward the center of the street. 
Q. Did Miss Spencer cut sharply to her left when she ap-
plied her brakes Y 
A. Yes, sir, she cut to the left. 
Q. What kind of a night was it? I mean with regard to 
the weather? 
A. It was misting. 
Q. Do you know whether she had a windshield wiper on · 
her carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it working that night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As you went down the street were you loolt · 
page 71 } ing ahead out of the windshield before you struck 
Mr. Bennett? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say that you didn't see him until the car was 
within about eight feet of him Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Ho'v was he dressed that night Y 
·A. He had on his uniform and he had on his top coat, a 
dark top coat. 
Q. After Miss Spencer parked her car did you and she 
get outY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And go to where }.{r. Bennett was? 
A. No, sir, they were bringing him on up to put him in 
the car at that time. 
Q. Then did the officers take him on to the hospital' 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. Where did you and Miss Spencer then goY 
A. We went out to Miss Spencer's father's and mother's. 
Q. She went home after her father? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did she tell Mr. Fourquean, the policeman, where she 
was going? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did she get his consent to go 7 . 
A. Yes. . 
page 72 } Q. Then did you go with her to her home after 
her fatherY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether or not she and her father then 
went back to the hospital where they had taken Mr. Bennett 1 
. A. Yes, we went back by the hospital and her mother got 
·out and stayed and we went on down to the police station. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. You say you had phoned to :Miss Spencer to come after 
youf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were studying together 1 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And Miss Spencer did come after you 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You got in the car at your house near the hospital? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then you and :Wiis Spencer drove down to Main Street 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You entered l\1ain Street intending to drive down tu 
the Southern Depot and turn around and go on to Miss Spen-
cer's hornet 
·A. Yes, sir. · 
page 73 ~ Q. Where you entered J\1ain Street, that was 
how many blocks from the Southern Depot-one 
block fro~ the corner of Wilbon A yenue and three more blocks 
down to the Southern Depot? 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. That is about right, isn't it 1 There may be a short 
street in there. It is just about four average city blocks from 
'vhere you entered Main Street down to the Southern Depot? 
A. We entered up at the Post Office. · 
Q. And that is just a very small ways from the corner of 
Main Street and Wilbon Avenue 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And ·from Main Street and Wilbon Avenue there is a 
street that runs across at the hotel and the next street is Arch 
Street and then the next street Bank Street, near which this 
accident took place, and the next is the Southern Depot? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And I believe you said that you and Miss Spencer had 
been studying for your examinations together? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were drivrng down the street and you saw Mr. 
Bennett standing in the street and 'vhen you first saw him 
you were about eight feet from him? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And you told Miss Spencer to watch 7 
page 74 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had she up to that time seen J\1r. Bennett? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. She hadn't given any indication of having seen him f 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Did she blow her horn prior to that time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And when you told her to watch you say she applied 
her brakes and swerved the carY 
A. And swerved the car to the left. 
Q. But almost immediately she struck ~ir. Bennett after 
you told her to watch? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I understood that 1\Iiss Spencer turned her car to the 
left. Had she turned it to the left before she struck Mr. 
Bennett? 
A. When I hollered "Watch" she turned the car to the 
left and applied the brakes. 
Q. You couldn't have been turned much to the left at the 
time she struck him because it couldn't take long to go eight 
feet. That is true, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The direction of the car had not changed but a very 
little bit, if any, at the time Mr. Bennett was struck. Isn't 
that correct, you think? . 
page 75 r A. Well, she swerved right swiftly but I didn't 
notice. 
Q. But she could only do what she could do while the car 
was going-you saw him when he was about eight feet in 
front and then you called out and then Miss Spencer just 
had that limited time after your calling out to make any 
change in her direction or do anything else 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Settle : 
Q. Miss Nichols, didn't this accident occur along there near 
the storehouse formerly occupied by Land and Walton? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And the storehouse of the old seed company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Those stores are on the west side of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether or not those stores were occu-
pied or vacant at the time of the accident? · 
A. Lands and Walton wasn't occupied. I don't know about 
the old seed store. 
Q. Were there any other stores along there vacant at the 
time? 
A. I don't know. 
J. G. Bennett, Admr., etc., v. Eliz. Spencer, et al. 71 
Q. Can you say whether or not the Land and 
page 76 ~ Walton store and the old seed· store were lighted 
that night by electricity! 
A. Neither one of them were that night. · 
Q. Was there any light of any kind? 
A. I didn't see any. 
ELIZABETH .SPENCER, 
one of the defendants, having been first duly sworn, testified 
as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Settle : 
Q. You are Miss Elizabeth Spencer Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the daughter of Mr. T. M. Spencer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you lived all of your life in South Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you f 
A. Seventeen. 
Q. How did you and "Miss Sarah Nichols happen to be to-
gether on the night of January 23rd when Mr. Bennett was 
injured? 
A. We 'vere goipg to study our exams together. 
Q. You were both in the high school at South Boston Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were going to study together for 
page 77 ~ examinations? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did you happen to go after Miss Nichols? 
A. It wasn't convenient for her brother to bring her up 
in his car so I went after her in our car. 
Q. She was going to study with you at your home? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. Did sl1e 'phone you that her brother couldn't bring 
her? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did she ask you to come after her? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe she lives on Jeffrey Street in South Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that some distance from your ho~.e! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And your home is where T 
A. On Peach Avenue. 
Q. I believe Peach Avenue is one block from Main Street 
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and your home is located on Peach A~enue opposite upper 
~ain StreetY · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been driving an automobile! 
A. Three years. 
Q. You have an operator's permit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 78 r Q. What time did yon get around to Miss Nich-
ols' on that night to pick her up and take her to 
your home? 
.A. I imagine it was around five after seven. 
Q. Did you stop there and blow the horn for her or did 
you go in for her f 
.A. I stopped and blew the horn. 
Q. Did she come out and get in the car immediately? 
' .A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where did you and she go? 
A. We went down to the end of J e:ffi-ey Street and up Fern-
ston Street and came up Broad Street to the Post Office 
and turned and went down Main Street. 
Q. Where were you going down Main StreetT 
.A. We had been in the habit of going all the way to the 
Southern Railway to turn around I told her we would go 
down there to turn around. 
Q. When you got down on Main Street between Arch Street 
and Bank Street (Arch Street con1es out by Patterson's drug 
store) what happened? 
, A.. Nothing happened. 
Q. What I had reference to was the accident in which Mr. 
Bennett was injured, but I will ask you this: Did you see 
/
.Mr. W. R. Bennett that night between the intersections of 
Arch Street and Bank StreetY · 
A.. No. 
page 79 ~ Q. Do you know where Arch Street is? 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. What I am trying to get at is this: Just tell us every-
thing you know about the accident in which Mr. W. R. Ben-
nett was injured and where it occurred Y 
A. Well, I was going down the street about twenty miles 
V an hour and I was on the right-hand side of the street and I was well over on my side of the street and about, I imagine, 
fifty feet from the intersection. 
Q. You mean the intersection of Main with Bank StreetT 
~. Yes, sir. We were g·oing on down there and I was look-
/ing· ·where I was p;oing ll:nd 1\t[iss Nichols hollered "Watch", 
V and about that time I saw 1\fr. Benentt too and I swerved 
my car to the left as quickly as I could and applied my brakes 
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too as quickly as I could and when I sa'v Mr. Bennett he was 
rolling toward the middle of the street. ' 
Q. You mean after you had hit him f 
A. After I had hit him. So I pulled around and parked 
on the left side of the street and got out of the car. 
Q. When you say the left side of the street, do you mean 
over on the east side of the street, over on the same side the 
ABC Store is on¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When Miss Nichols cried "Watch", or "Watch out'', or 
something like that, you say you swerved your car 
page 80 ~ to the left and applied your brakes? 
A. Yes, sir. / 
Q. But you couldn't avoid hitting Mr. Bennett? v 
A. No, sir. 
Q. After you applied your brakes how far did your car go 
before you stopped it? v--· 
A. About eight feet, I imagine. 
Q. What position was Mr~ Bennett in then in the street? 
A. Before I hit him. 
Q. No, I mean at the time that you first saw Mr. Bennett 
how far was he out in the street from the curb on the west 
side of the street? 
A. I think he was about fifteen feet. V 
Q. Was he facing you or did he have his back toward you Y 
A. His back was turned toward me. v" 
Q. At the time that you struck him was his back turned 
to you or had he turned slightly Y 
A. I don't know ho'v he-I don't know that. 
Q. Do you know 'vhther or not there were any vacant 
stores on the night of January 23rd there on the west side 
of Main Street about where this collision occurred? 
A. Lands and Walton Furniture Company was empty and 
I don't know about the store next to that, whether that was 
einpty or not. 
Q. Were there any lights in those. stores that 
page 81 ~ night f · 
A. There were no lights on either side of the 
street in anv of the stores below the A B C Store. 
Q. Do yo1; recall where Mr. Fourquean, the policeman, was 
standing- in the street? 
A. I didn't see anybody but Mr. Bennett. 
Q. You didn't see anybody but Mr. Bennett? 
A. No. 
Q. Whose car ·was this you were driving! 
A. :hly father's. 
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Q. Did you obtain permission from him that night to drive 
. it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did. you tell him where you were going Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you on any business for your father that night? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you came out of Broad Street at the Post Office 
into Main Street your most direct route home would have 
been to turn to your right and proceed north along Main 
Street, wouldn't it¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q· Why then did you turn to your left and go south on 
Ma1n Street? . 
A. Because I thought we could get some fresh air before 
we went home. We had studied all afternoon and 
page 82 ~ were going to study the rest of the night and we 
hadn't ·been out so we decided we would ride 
around there a little bit and it .would help us a little· bit. 
Q. What kind of a night was it? 
: · A. It was real cold and it was misty. 
Q. Was it dark? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you tell us approximately what time the accident 
occurred? 
A. Around seven ten. 
Q. Did you have a windshield wiper on your car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it working? 
A. Y·es, sir. 
Q. Was your windshield wiper actually turned on and in 
motion at the time of this accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Miss Spencer, I understood that you had a driver's 
permit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had it, you said, for something like three years f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 83 ~ Q. And you had been driving your father's car 
frequently in that period, hadn't you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your family consists of your father and mother and 
yourself. Are there any other children 7 
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A. Two more, girl .and boy. 
Q. You are the oldest? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had been in the habit of driying the car fre-
quently~ constantly almost 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATIC!;. 
By Mr. Settle : . 
Q. Did you have general permission from your father to 
. drive this car at your will and pleasure whenever you de-
sired to do so without asking his permission or did you, 
whenever you drove it, hav:e to first obtain his permission to 
do so?. 
A. I never drov.e the car unless Daddy gave me his con-
sent. That was understood, that I was to ask him if I wanted 
the car. 
Q. And did you always ask your father for permission to 
use it before you did drive it 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When he was at home who was the principal 
pag:e 84 ~ user of the car? 
A. My father. 
By the Court: 
· Q. What kind of an automobile was this f 
A. Chevrolet. 
Q. Sedan or coupe Y 
A. Coupe-r mean sedan. 
~V Q. Did it have two windshield wipersf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Just one? 
: j 
Rv Mr. Settle: 
·Q. That was located right in front of you, the driver! 
. A. Yes, sir. 
THOMAS M. SPENCER, 
nne of the defendants, having been first dniy sworn, testi-
fied as follows: 
Examined by Mr. McKinney: 
Q. You are Mr. Thomas M. Spencer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are one of the defendants in this suit? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
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Q. You live in South Boston, do you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 85 ~ Q. How long have you been living there Y 
A. About thirty years. 
Q. What is your business Y · 
A. Tobacconist. I work for the Imperial Tobacco Com-
pany. 
Q. Who are you employed by? 
A. Imperial Tobacco Company. 
Q. You have some position with the factory Y 
A. Factory manager. ·. 
Q. You have been living there about thirty years¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were the owner, were you, of this automobile which 
is involved in this suit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Being driven at the time by your daughter¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The evidence is that you were not in the car at the time Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where were yon at the time? 
A. I was at home. 
Q. In South Boston Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old is your daughter Elizabeth? 
A. She is seventeen. 
Q. She was at that time, I believe, a student in 
page 86 ~ the high school in South Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. , Graduated there this last J nne Y 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. This car belonged to you? 
, A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was the principal user of the automobile? 
A. I was. 
Q. How much family have you? 
A. A wife and three children. 
Q. A boy younger than ~Hss. Elizabeth? How old is he? 
A. Fourteen. 
Q. The next child is a girl? 
A. Twelve, yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you exactly and what were you doing at 
the time she went out with the carV 
A. I was listening to Amos and Andy. 
Q. Did she ask permission to use the carY 
A. Yes, sir, and I went with her out to the car and saw 
her crank up and go off. 
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Q. Did . she use this automobile at her will and pleasure 
whenever she sa'v fit or did you require her to obtain per-
mission from you Y 
A. I required her to get permission from me to drive it. 
Q. Every time she used it? 
page 87 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. Did she ask permission on this occasion Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. Was Miss Spencer, your daughter, on any business at 
all for you? Had you sent her on any business for your-
self? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What was she out for-just pleasure, her own pleasure 7 
A. Her own pleasure, to get ~Iiss Nichols. 
Q. Did you hear of the accident pretty soon after it hap-
pened? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do then Y 
A. We got right in the car, she, my wife and Miss Nichols, 
and went to the hospital and left my wife there and went on 
to the Police Station like she said. The policeman said to 
come back there. . 
Q. Went there to report for any questions that might want 
to be asked? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. No charge was ever made against her for reckless driv- • 
ingt 
Mr. Martin: We object to that. 
The Court: I don't believe that has anything to do with 
ft. That is the criminal side of it. 
page 88 } By Mr. McKinney: 
Q. What is your age, ~1:1:. Spencer Y . 
A. Fifty-four. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By !fr. Martin: 
Q. I understood you owned this automobile, Mr. Spencer? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. It 'vas an automobile that you purchased and main-
tained for the pleasure, comfort and convenience of yourf:!elf 
and the members of your family, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. And your· daughter, Miss Elizabeth Spencer,· used it 
with your permission but almost habitually, didn't she Y 
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A. Yes, she always had to have my permission. 
Q. I say with your permission but very, very frequently! 
A. Not so frequently during school hours. · 
Q. I didn't mean whether it was one hundred times a month 
or fifty times. I meant that she used it frequently 7 
A. I used the car for my business and when I could let her 
have it and she wa'nted it I would let her have it. 
Q. And your business was a. factory man 7 The only busi-
.ness you had to do with your car was going backward and 
forward to your place of business 7 
A. Yes. 
page 89 ~ Q. Which was just a half mile or something like 
that? 
A. A good mile. 
Qo. When you go south do yon always take your car with 
you? 
A. Not always. 
Q. ·You very often leave it there for the pleasure and com-
fort and conve'nience of your familyY 
A. Leave it with my wife. 
Q. I understand, of course, your wife is in charge when 
you are away, and. probably when you are there, but what I 
am getting at is this:, It wasn't purely a personal car but 
it was a car the whole family enjoyed and got l1ealthful recre-
·ation out off 
A. After my business was over we enjoyed the car. 
Q. When doing so didn't interfere with your business Y 
A. Yes. 
RE-DIRECT EXAltiiNATION. 
By Mr. Settle:· 
· Q. Did you buy and maintain this car, Mr. Spencer, pri-
marilv for vour own use a'nd business? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you use the car practically every day in going 
to your business f 
A. Yes, sir, every day. 
page 90 ~ Q. You drove it down in the morning to busi-
ness. Did you drive it back home at noon Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Drive back in it after lunch to your business Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Drive home at night in it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did your wife have your general permission to use this 
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car whenever she pleased or did you also require her :first to 
get your permission before she used it f 
A. Well, I always required her to get my permission. 
Q. Has it been your custom for some years to go south 
on the tobacco market during the seasons jn Georgia and 
Carolina? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you leave for the south ·on business in whose pos-
session would you leave the car? 
A. Leave it in my 'vife 's possession. 
Q .. So while you were away and absent from home she con .. 
trolled the use of itT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And while you were at home you 'always controlled the 
use of it? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. And the members of your family before using 
pag·e 91 ~ it always had to first obtain your permission? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. When you could conveniently do so did you always give 
your daughter permission to use it when she would ask you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is the same true of your wife? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Bv the Court: 
"'Q. Is your wife also a driver of the car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ho'v about the boy 7 
A. No, sir, just the three of us drive. 
Bv Mr. Settle: 
.. Q. During the business days of the week, after you would 
drive to your place of business at the Imperial Tobacco fac-
tory in South Boston, where would this car rel!lain until you 
went home at lunch? 
A. Where would the car remain? 
Q. Where would it. remain after you drove. down in the 
morning to your place of business? Would you keep the car 
there or did it go back home f 
A. I would keep it there. 
Q. You kept it down at your place of business all day? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And drive backward and forwards as you had 
page 92 ~ to do to your home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
---- ----- -----
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RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. The only use you had, so far as your business was con-
cerned, was to ride in it to the factory Y 
.A. 1res, sir. . · 
Q. And you said the factory was in South Boston 1 
.A. 1[ es, sir. . 
Q. Just a short distance from your homeY 
A. A good mile. 
Q. So it was your habit to ride backwards and forwards 
to the factory where you worked in the carY 
A. 1[ es, sir. 
Q. That was the only business use you had for it? 
A. 1[ es, sir. 
Q. And I understand you kept the car so you could make 
that use of it and then, in addition to that, as a means of 
pleasure and comfort and healthful recreation for yourself 
and the members of your family! 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Settle : 
Q. After the close of business for the day or on Sundays 
when you and your family go out riding in this car 
page 93 ~ for recreation and enjoyment, who always drove 
the carY 
A. I did. 
Mr. Settle: That is our Gase. 
Note: The Jury was excused until 10 o'clock A. M., Sep-
tember 7, 1935. 
Mr. McKinney: The defendants move the Court to strike 
the plaintiff's evidence on the ground that the evidence in 
the case shows that the deceased, W. R. Bennett, was guilty 
of contributory negligence which proximately resulted in the 
injury as a matter of law; that there is no issue to submit to 
the Jury in view of the fact that the decisions on this sub-
ject of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in similar 
cases bear out our contention that the deceased Bennett by 
going into the street on a misty night.and turning his back in 
the direction in which traffic was coming, heedlessly and reck-
lessly exposing himself to danger, makes a situation in which 
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he is convicted by law of contributory negligence; on the 
further ground that the plaintiff's evidence does not support 
the allegations of the notice in which it is alleged that the 
defendant, Elizabeth Spencer, was at. the time of the acci-
dent engaged upon business of her father, the de-
page 94 ~ fendant, Thomas M. Spencer, as his agent and 
servant, and upon the further ground that the evi-
dence does not sustain the allegation of the notice which ap-
parently is designed to bring the case within the principle 
of the family purpose doctrine. It is alleged that she used 
the car at will for her o'vn pleasure and that the car was 
maintained by the defendant, Thomas M. Spencer, for the 
purpose of affording recreation, pleasure and enjoyment to 
his family. We submit that the evidence in the case, intro-
duced by the plaintiff, is insufficient to sustain the notice on 
any of those grounds and that as to the first ground I men:.. 
tio·ned, contributory negligence, that the evidence conclusively 
convicts the deceased of contributory negligence, that there 
is no conflict in the evidence on the point that he was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Note : This motion 'vas argued. 
The Court : Under the practice in Virginia now I think I 
had better overrule this motion, and it is so ordered. 
lvir. l\Icl{inney: Defendants except to the action of the 
Court in overruling the motion to strike plaintiff's evidence 
for the reasons stated in. the motion and in the oral argu~ 
ment. I except to the Court's ruling upon the 
page 95 ~ ground. that as to the contributory negligence of 
the deceased the evidence is uncontroverted that 
he 'vas guilty of negligence as a matter of law and there· is 
no issue to subn1it to the .Jury, and as to the sufficiency of 
the proof to sustain the notice, there is no evidence showing 
the agency or relationship of master and servant between 
the two defendants and the evidence does not make out a case 
for the application of the family purpose doctrine. There 
was no operation of the automobile by the defendant, Eliza~ 
beth Spencer, at her will and pleasure and no general per~ 
n1ission by her father, Thomas M. Spencer, was ever given 
and for that reason the family purpose doctrine does not 
apply and the relationship of master and servant would have 
to be shown to hold the defendant Thomas M. Spencer liable. 
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page 96 ~ INSTRUCTIONS. 
INSTRUCTION P-1, OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF 
, (GRANTED). 
"The Court instructs the .Jury that the law of this State 
is that where a person (who is free from negligence on his 
part contributing to and being a proximate cause of the in-
juries complained of) sustains injuries resulting, in his death 
as the result of the negligence of another, then the estate 
of the person so injured and dying is entitled to recover of 
the person or persons causing the said death a sum not in 
excess of $10,000.00. (Granted, N. S. T., Jr., Judge, 9/6/35.)" 
Defendants, by counsel, excepted to the giving of this in-
struction and stated that this instruction may properly pro-
pound an abstract proposition of law, but should not be given 
in this case for the reason that no actionable negligence is 
shown by the evidence, and the issue sl1ould not be submitted 
to a jury. 
INSTRUCTION P-2, OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF 
(GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs 'the Jury that it was the duty of tl1e 
defendant, Elizabeth $pencer, at the time of the accident in-
volved in this cause: 
"1. To drive her automobile at a careful rate of .speed, 
not greater nor less than was reasonable and proper, having 
due regard to the traffic, surface, width of the 
page 97 ~ highway, and other conditions then and there ex-
isting, and at such a speed as not to endanger the 
life, limb or property of any person. At the scene of this 
accident a rate of speed in excess of fifteen miles per hour 
was pri1na facie excessive, and 
'' 2. To keep said automobile under reasonable control, 
and 
"3. At all times to keep a careful lookout for pedestrians 
and upon seeing pedestrians in the street in front of the auto-
mobile to give timely warning of her approach and to keep 
her automobile under such control so as not to unnecessarily 
endang-er them, and 
"4. To drive said automobile on the right-hand side of the 
street, if practicable to do so. 
"The Court further instn1cts the tTnry that if they lJelieve 
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from the evidence that the defendant, Elizabeth Spencer, 
failed to discharge any one or more of these duties and that 
such failure was the sole proximate cause of the accident 
which resulted in the death of W. R. Bennett, then they shall 
find for the plaintiff. (Granted N. S. T. Jr., Judge, 9/6/35.)" .. 
Defendants, by counsel, excep.ted to the giving of this in-
struction on the ground that no presumption arises from the 
exceeding by a driver of an automobile of an ar-
page 98 ~ bitrary speed prescribed by statute, and all cases 
must be considered upon the circumstances and 
conditions arising or existing at the time of the alleged vio-
lation; and that there is no evidence in this case to support 
the statements of law embodied in the instruction. On the 
contrary, the preponderance of the· evidence is that no such 
violations as are mentioned in the instruction were committed 
by the defendant driver. 
I 
INSTRUCTION P-3, OFFERED BY. PLAINTIFF 
(GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that a defendant who relies 
on a plea of contributo1'Y negligence. has the burdep. of prov-
ing such contributory negligence by a preponderance of the 
evidence. · 
''The Court further tells the Jury that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense unless it is a proximate cause of the 
accident. ! I i --1rlffli1J 
''A proximate cause is that cause which naturally leads to 
and may have been expected to be directly instrumental in 
producing the injury. It is that act which directly produced 
or concurred in producing the injury. (Granted, N. S. T., Jr., 
~Judge, 9/6/35.)" 
Defendants, by counsel, excepted to the giving of this in-
struction on the ground that the contributory neg-
page 99 ~ ligence of the plaintiff's intestate in this case is 
apparent as a matter of law, and there is no evi-
dence in this case upon which the court can properly submit 
to the jury the question of the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff's intestate. 
INSTRUCTION P-5, OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF 
(GRANTED) .. 
"The Court instructs the Jury that even if you believe 
from the evidence that at the time of the accident in ques-
tion the deceased, W. R. Bennett, was standing about the 
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middle of Main Street in the Town of South Boston near the 
intersection of Main and Bank Streets facing south, and that 
Eliz,abe.th Spencer approached him in an automobile driving 
alQrig ·said Main Street from the north and that she saw or 
by the exercise of reasonable care could have seen said Ben-
nett, and that there was danger of her automobile striking 
him, and further saw or should have seen that said Bennett 
was unaware of his danger or could not or would not save 
himself and 'that then said Elizabeth Spencer by the exercise 
of reasonable care in the management of her automobile could 
have avoided the accident, but failed to do so, then your ver-
dict should be for the plaintiff. (Granted, N. S. T., Jr., 
Judge, 9/6/35.) '' 
Defendants, by counsel, excepted to the giving of this in-
struction on the following g·rounds: That the evidence does 
not sustain the statement in the instruction that the de-
ceased was standing about the middle of the street, 
page 100 ~ and the uncontradicted evidence is that this is 
· not true. And further that the law required Ben-
nett to exercise a higher degree of care at the point where 
he was crossing than was required of the driver of the au-
tomobile, and that the deceased was not in a position of peril 
which the driver of the car was under obligation to heed 
eve·n if she had seen him, and that under the circumstances 
in which he was standing or walking in the street he was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and 
there is nothing in the evidence upon which the question of 
the liability of the defendant on the principle of the ''last 
clear chance" could be submitted to the jury. The instruc-
tion as offered is not a correct statement of the principle of 
"last clear chance". 
INSTRUCTION P-6, OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF 
(GRANTED). 
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover they shall 
then proceed to fix the amount of the damages . 
. "In ~stimating the damages, the Jury shall take into con-
~aderahon: 
"1. The probable earnings of the deceased, considering· 
his age, business capacity, experience, habits and 
page 101 ~ energy, and 
and 
''2. The expectancy of the duration of his life, 
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'' 3. The loss of his care, attention and society to his widow 
and children, and 
'' 4. You may add such further sum as you deem fair and 
just by way of solace and comfort to his widow and childre:p. 
for the sorrow, suffering and mental anguish occasioned by 
his death, provided you do not find over $10,000.00, the amount 
sued for. 
''The Court further instructs the Jury that they should 
in their verdict, if it is for the Plaintiff, apportion among 
the widow and children of said W. R. Bennett, if they deem 
wise, the damages awarded by them. 
''In this matter the Jury has absolute discretion and they 
may award the whole of such damag·es to the widow or the 
'vhole thereof to any child or they may divide the damage:;; 
among· the widow and children excluding any one of these 
in such way as they think proper. (Granted, N. S. T., Jr., 
Judge, 9/6/35.)" 
Defendants, by counsel, excepted to the giving of this in-
struction on the ground that there is no evidence as to the 
expectancy of the duration of the life of the deceased, and 
upon the general ground that no instruction o·n damages 
should be given for the reason that no actionable negligence 
has been proved. 
page 102 ~ INSTRUCTION P-11, O:B,FERED BY PLAIN-
TIFF (GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that unde; the evidence in 
this case the defendant, Thomas 1L Spencer, is liable for 
the acts of his daughter, Elizabeth Spencer, and any verdict 
that they find against said Elizabeth Spencer should also be 
against Thon1as 1\L Spencer. (Granted N. S. T. Jr., Judge, 
9,16/35.) ,, 
Defendants, by counsel, excepted to the giving of this in-
struction on the ground that this instruction disregards tb'e 
fact that there is no evidence to sho'v that the relation of 
principal and agent or master and servant existed between 
the two defendants, and that there is no evidence in the case 
justifying the submission of the case to the jury on the plin-
eiplc known as the "family purpose doctrine", as laid down 
in the cases of Litz v. Hannan, 151 Va. 363; Green v. Smith, 
153 Va. 675; Oliver v. Si1ntnon.s, 161 Va., 170 S. E. 583, and 
Baptist v. Slate, 173 S. E. 514. 
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t;STRUCTION B, OFFERED BY DEFENDANTS AND 
Al\1:ENDED BY THE COURT (GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that although they may be-
lieve that the defendant Elizabeth Spencer was negligent in 
the operation of the automobile at the time of the accident, 
and that her neg·ligence continued up to the moment of the 
accident, yet if the decedent Bennett failed to 
page 103 ~ exercise reasonable prudence for his own safety, 
and their neglig·ence concurred in producing the 
injury, and his negligence was a cause thereof, they must find 
for the defendants; unless you believe from the evidence that 
the defendant, Elizabeth Spencer, could by the exercise of or-
dinary care have discovered the plaintiff's intestate's peril 
.and avoided the accident. (Granted N. S. T. Jr., Judge, 
9/6/35.) '' 
This instructio·n as originally offered by the defendants, 
concluded in these words: ''and his negligence was a proxi-
mate cause thereof, they must find for the defendants.'' 
The Court struck out the words "proximate cause" and in 
lieu thereof amended same by inserting the 'vord ''cause''. 
After the word ''defendants'' the court further amended by 
adding the following: ''unless you believe from the evidence 
that the defendant, Elizabeth Spencer, could, by the exercise 
of ordinary care, have discovered the plaintiff's intestate's 
peril and avoided the accident.'' Defendants, by counsel, 
excepted to the action of the court in amending the instruction 
as offered and adding a statement of the doctrine of ''last clear 
chance'', there 'being no evidence on whiclr to submit that 
doctrine to the jury. 
-
pag·e 104 ~ INSTRUCTION C, OFFERED BY DEFEND-
ANTS AND Al\fENDED BY THE 
COURT (GRANTED) .. 
"The Court instructs the jury that the law is that a pedes-
trian in crossing a street must keep a lookout for approach-
ing vehicles and must use the care a person of ordinary pru-
dence would use under the circun1stanccs. He cannot blindly 
expose himself to danger. If in this case the deceased Ben-
nett failed to act with ordinary prudence required of a rea-
sana ble person under the circumstances, and as a result of 
his negligence he was struck and injured, then they should 
.find for the defendants; unless you shall believe from the 
evidence that the defendant Elizabeth Spencer could, by the 
exercise of ordinary care, have discovered the plaintiff's in-
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testate's peril and avoided the accident. (Granted N. S. T. 
Jr., Judg-e, 9/6/35.)" 
This instruction as originally offered by the defendants 
contained the word "proximate'' before the word "result". 
The Court amended the instruction by striking out the word 
"proximate" and adding to the instruction the same clause 
that was added by the Court to Instruction B. Defendants, 
by counsel, excepted· to the amendments, stat~ng the same 
grounds herefor as appear in the exception to Instruction B. 
page 105 } INSTRUCTION D, OFFERED BY DEFEND-
ANTS (GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that the law of Virginia re-
uires that pedestrians in crossing streets shall cross wherever 
ossible only at intersections or cross-walks, and shall cross 
nly at right angles and not diagonally. If a pedestrian 
crosses between intersections he is required to exercise a 
greater degree of vigilance than at intersections. At places 
between intersections when a pedestrian desides to cross the 
ordinary care he is required to exercise is greater and higher 
than that required of the driver or operator of a vehicle. 
(Granted N. S. T. Jr., Judge, 9/6/35.) '' 
Plaintiff, by counsel, excepted to the action· of the Court 
in giving· this instruction for the reason that it is not a cor-
rect staten1ent of the law, and for the further reason that 
even if it correctly states the law it does so in a way as 
not to be clear, but on the contrary to be misleading to the 
jury. Counsel for plaintiff also excepted to the action of 
the Court in giving for the defendants Instructions B, C 
and D for the reason that these instructions entirely over-
look the fact that the deceased Bennett was a police officer 
nnd under the evidence in this case acting in the discharge of 
his duties 'vhen killed and excepted to the refusal of the 
Court to modify these instructions so as to include this fact. 
page 106 r INSTRUCTION E, OFFERED BY DEFEND-
ANTS AND AMENDED BY THE 
COURT (GRANTED). 
''The Court instructs the jury that it is their duty to try 
this case without being influenced by sympathy from the mere 
fact that W. R.. B'e'nnett was injured in the accident com-
plained of and~has since died, for the jury as much as the 
court are under the solemn obligation of an oath to decide 
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this case according to the law and the facts. Without negli-
gence on the part of defendant Miss Elizabeth Spencer, 
neither of the defendants can be held liable; and even if the 
jury belives from the evidence that defendant :Miss Eliza-
beth Spencer wa_s n'egligent at the time of the accident, yet 
if they -furth~r believe from the evidence that the said police-
man Bennett- also was negligent, and that his carelessness 
contributed -to any extent to his injury, the plaintiff cannot 
recover against the defendants, or either of them, unless you 
believe from the evidence that the defendant Elizabeth Spen-
cer could by the exercise of ordinary care have discovered 
the plaintiff's intestate's peril and avo~ded the accident. 
(Granted N. S. T. Jr., Judge, 9/6/35.)" 
This instruction was amended by the Court by adding the 
same clause that was added to Instructions B and C, and the 
defendants, by counsel, excepted to the action of the court in 
so doing- for the same reason stated in the exception to In-
struction B. 
page 107 ~ INSTRUCTION F, OFFERED BY DEFEND-
_ANTS (GRANTED). 
"The court instructs the jury that negligence on the part 
of Miss Elizabeth Spencer, one of the defendants in this 
case, cannot be presumed from the mere happening of the 
accident in which W. R. Bennett was injured, but the burden 
is upon the plaintiff to prove by a clear preponderance of 
the evidence that the said defendant was negligent in the 
manner alleged in the notice ·of motion for judgment, and that 
the negligence charged therein was the direct and proximate 
cause of the said Bennett's injury, and if the preponderance 
of the evidence does not establish these facts the jury should 
find for the defendants. 
"The eourt further tells the jury that the. fact that W. R. 
Bennett 'vas injured in the accident complained of does not 
raise even a pri,ma facie presumption that Miss Elizabeth 
Spencer was guilty of negligence on said occasion. The party 
who alleges negligence on the part of another must estab-
lish it by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence 
must show more tha·n the probability of a negligent act or 
else there can be no recovery by the plaintiff. (Granted N. 
S. T .. Jr., Jnclge, 9/6/35.)" 
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INSTRUCTION P-4, OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF 
(REFUSED). 
"The Court instructs the Jury that the rules of law or-
. dinarily applicable to pedestrians do not apply in 
page 108 ~ the case of police officers 'vho are in the proper 
or nooessary discharge of their duties. 
"The Court tells the Jury that if they believe from the evi-
dence that W. R. Bennett was at the time of the accident en-
gag·ed in the discharge of his duties as Chief of Police of the 
Town of South Boston and that the proper discharge of these 
duties made it necessary or proper for him to be at the place 
where he was when struck, then it was not negligence per se 
for him to be at that place. Under the circumstances here 
set out, it was, however, necessary for said Bennett to exer-
cise ordinary care for his own safety, that is, such care as a 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the same 
circun1stances and conditions. (Refused N. S. T. J., Judge, 
9/6/35.)" 
Plaintiff, by counsel, excepted to the action of the Court 
in refusing this instruction for the. reason that it is a correct 
statement of the law and is proper under the facts of this 
case.. Counsel for plaintiff then offered the same instruction 
'vith the first paragraph thereof omitted. The Court refused 
the instruction in this form and counsel for plaintiff excepted 
to the action of the court for the same reason. · 
page 109 ~ INS1.,RUCTION P-4 (THIRD FOR~f), OF-
FERED BY PLAINTIFF (REF·USED). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that the rule of law ordi-
narily applicable to pedestrians do not apply in the case of 
police officers who are in the proper or necessary discharge 
f)f their duties. Such officers, however, are required to ex-
ercise ordinary care for their own safety. (Refused N. S. T . 
• Jr., Judge, 9/6/35.)" 
Plaintiff, by counsel, excepted to the refusal of the Court 
to give this instruction for the same reason set forth as to In-
struction P-4 in its original form. 
INSTRUCTION A, OFFERED BY DEFENDANTS (RE-
FUSED). 
"The court tells the jury that before they can find a ver-
dict against T. l\L Spencer in this case the plaintiff must 
prove hy the greater 'veight of the evidence the follo·wing: 
90 Supreme <Jourt of Ap~als of Virginia. 
'' 1. That Miss Elizabeth Spencer was operating the car in 
a neglig·ent manner at the time of the ·accident and that as a 
direct proximate cause of her negligent operation of the same 
W. R. Bennett was injured; and 
' '' 2. That the car which she was driving at the time of the 
accident was purchased, kept and maintained by T. M. Spen-
cer for family use and that the members of his family, and 
especially Miss Elizabeth Spencer, were allowed to use the 
same at their will and pleasure; and that she had 
}Jage 110 ~ general permission fron1 her said father to use the 
same whenever she so desired; or that 
"3. At the tim·e of the accident Miss Elizabeth Spencer 
was driving the car as the agent or servant of said T. M. 
Spencer in the discharge of some business for him. 
''If tbe plaintiff shall fail to so prove by the greater weight 
of the evidence then the jury should find for both defendants. 
''The court further tells the jury that even if they should 
find that Miss Elizabeth Spencer's negligent operation of the 
car was the proximate cause of Policeman Bennett's injuries, 
yet if the greater weight of the ·evidence shows that T. M. 
Spencer on said occasion only gave his daughter permission 
to use the car that night for her o''\rn pleasure or convenience; 
and that at the time of the accident she was driving the .same 
for her own use and pleasure and 'vas not acting as the serv-
ant or agent of her said father in the transaction of any busi-
ness for him, the jury cannot find a verdict against the said 
T. M. Spencer. (Refused N. S. T. Jr., Judge, 9/6/35.)" 
Defendants, by 'counsel, excepted to the action of the Court 
in· refusing this instruction for the reason that it is a correct 
~tatement of the law applicable to the case according to the 
defendants' theory and is covered by no other instruction in 
the case. 
page 111 ~ INSTRUCTION G, OFFERED B.Y DEFEND-
ANTS (R.EFUSED·). 
"The court instruct's the jury that the m·ere charge in the 
notice of motion of the plaintiff, charging the defendants, or 
either of them, with some act of commission or omission, and 
that such act ·was a negligent act, is neither proof of the act 
nor of its neglig.enee. The jury cannot guess. that the defend-
ant wa~ negligent ; but the act or acts charged as negligence 
must be proven by the gTeater weight of the evidence; and it 
must further appear by a preponderance of the evidence that 
such act or acts would not ha.ve been committed by a person . 
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of ordinary care. If the plaintiff fails in either, your ver-
dict must be for the defendants. (Refused N. S. T. Jr., Judge, 
9/6/35.') ,, 
Defendants, by counsel, excepted to the refusal of the Court 
to grant this instruction on the ground that the instruction 
is proper. 
INSTRUCTION H, OFFERED ·BY DEFENDANTS 
(REFUSED). ' 
"The Court instructs the jury that the same ruies of law 
requiring pedestrians to exercise ordinary care a.nd prudence 
in crossing streets applies to police officers in all respects 
as to other pedestrians. .Such officers are required by law 
to take the same precautions for their safety, ·as stated in 
other instructions in this case, as other pedestrians are re-
quired by law to observe under like circumstances 
page 112} a.nd conditions. (Refused N . .S. T. _Jr., Judge, 
9/6/35.), 
Defendants, by. counsel, excepted to the refusal o~ the Court 
to grant this instruction on the ground that it correctly states 
· the law as to all pedestrians, including a policeman. 
Thereupon, after the instructions were read to the jury, 
and after argument to the jury by counsel for plaintiff and 
counsel for the defendants, the jury retired to consider its 
verdict and returned a verdict in the following words and 
figures: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff against both 
defendants, and assess the damages at $5,000, all of which, 
after the deduction of costs and reasonable counsel fees, shall 
be paid to Mrs. Rosa Lee Bennett, widow of W. R. Bennett. 
B. W. Smith, Foreman.'' 
The defendants moved to set aside the aforesaid verdict 
nnd to enter-judgment for the defendants on the grounds, 
That the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence; 
Is against the evidence and without evidence to support it; 
For misdirection of the jury in granting instructions P-1, 
P-2, P-3, P-5, P-6 and P-11, offered by the plaintiff, and for 
the refusal of the court to grant Instructions A, G and H 
offered by the defendants, and for amending instructions B, 
C and E offered by the defendants ; 
page 113 } For the action of the Court in: overruling the 
motions of the defendants to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence; 
For admission of evidence objected to by the defendants 
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and for the exclusion oi evidence offered by the defendants, 
as shown by the record, and other errors· appearing from the 
record. 
And thereafter the Court, after considering said Motion 
and the argument of Counsel, entered an Order setting aside 
the verdict of the Jury and entering up final judgment for 
the defendants. To this action of the Court in setting aside 
the verdict of the Jury and enterii1g final judgment for the 
defendants, the plaintiff· excepted. 
By this Order execution of the judgment was suspended 
for a period of 90 days. 
page 114 ~ I, N. S. Turnbull, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court 
of Halifax County, who presided over the fore-
going trial of J. Gordon Bennett, Administrator of the estate 
of William R. Bennett, deceased, plaintiff, v. Elizabeth Spen-
cer and Thomas M. Spencer, defendants, do certify that the 
foregoing, together with the exhibit therein referred to, is a 
true and correct copy· and report of the evidence, and all of 
the evidence, all of the instructions granted and refused by 
the Court, and other incidents of the said trial of the said 
cause, 'vith the -exceptions and objections of the respective 
parties as therein set forth. 
As to the original exhibit introduced in evidence as shown · 
Ly the foregoing report, to-wit, a plat marked Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 1, it is agreed by counsel for plaintiff and defend-
ant that the blue print filed in evidence shall be transmitted 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals as part of the record in 
this cause in lieu of certifying to said Court copies of said 
exhibit. -
And I do further certify that the attorney for the defend-
ants had reasonable notice, in writing, given by the plain-
tiff of the time and place of tendering and presenting the 
testimony, exhibit, instructions, exceptions and other incidents 
of the trial to the undersig·ned 'for signature and authenti-
cation. 
Given under my hand this 5 day of October, 1935, with-
in ninety days after the entry of the final• judg-
page 115 ~ ment in said cause. 
N. S. TURNB.ULL, JR., 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
I, E. C. Lacy,· Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
Virginia, do certify that the foregoing report of the, testi-
mony, exhibit, instructions, exceptions and other incidents 
of the trial in the cause of J. Gordon Bennett, Administra-
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tor of the estate of William R. Bennett, deceased, plaintiff, 
v. Elizabeth Spencer and Thomas M. Spencer, defendants, 
together with the original exhibit therein referred to, all of 
which have been duly authenticated by the Judge of the said 
Court) were lodged and filed with me as Clerk of the said 
Court on. the 8th day of October, 1935. 
Virginia: 
E. 0. LACY, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
In the Clerk's Offioo of the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
I, E. C. Lacy, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and 
complete transcript of the record of the suit of J. Gordon 
Bennett Admr. of Wm. R. Benn-ett v. Elizabeth Spencer ·and 
'l,homas M. Spencer, mentioned in said record. 
Given under my hand this the 9th day of October, 1935. 
E. C. LACY, Clerk. 
State of :Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the County of 
Halifax. 
I, E. C. Lacy, ClerH:, do hereby certify that it appears by 
a paper writing filed with the papers of said suit that notice 
as required by law has been given of the intention of the 
plaintiff to apply for this transcript. 
G~ven under my hand this the 9th day of October, 1935. 
. E. C. LACY, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Va. 
Copy of Record, $32.50. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WAT~S, C. C. 
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